Lund University Agenda 2030 Graduate School is a global, cutting-edge research school and collaboration platform for issues related to societal challenges, sustainability and the 2030 Agenda. The 17 PhD students from all faculties at Lund University enrolled with the Agenda 2030 Graduate School relate their specific research topics to the Sustainable Development Goals. In this blog the PhD students of the Graduate School discuss topical research and societal issues related to the 2030 Agenda.
Posted on 12 October 2020 by Alva Zalar (Department of Architecture and Built Environment)
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.
My field of practice is within spatial planning. Urban planning in Sweden is to a high degree controlled through governmental measures; municipal planning monopoly, a development towards stronger regional networks and strong state support e.g. through the guidance by the National Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket). This means that we have a solid platform on several policy levels to achieve collective implementation of Agenda 2030. Does it also mean that we have a platform for accountability measures?
Most of the time, the answer is both yes and no. The National Board of Housing in Sweden has evaluated their own work with Agenda 2030, concluding that plenty of work has been initiated and pursued but that only a few is considered fulfilled[1]. Region Skåne regards the regional use of Agenda 2030 as scanty but that there is potential to develop it further, recommending to integrate the goals selectively to find what is relevant and also work actively with exposed goal conflicts[2]. On municipality level, the work with Agenda 2030 seems to differ a lot but there is a general call for better communication of national priorities and further support in follow-up[3]. Agenda 2030 seem to have increased the expectations to work actively with sustainability within urban planning and we see examples of trying to evaluate this work. It also seems to have exposed some goal conflicts, although the handling of such conflict might be pushed towards the future. The idea of choosing goals selectively is probably the most efficient way to go, although also poses a risk of neglecting certain perspectives.
Both the exposure of goal conflicts and selecting relevant goals to work with puts power relations to the test. For whom is a certain sustainability discourse sustainable? From what perspective, what scale? Accountability builds upon accepting the responsibility for the consequences, from all perspectives, of your actions. For urban planning, this actualizes the time perspective as well. Usually, urban planning is evaluated on the terms of the historical city and the outlook is the future city. This is often time frames on 50-100 years, which might give a clue on why there is a tendency to push conflicts into the future. Therefore, a remaining question is: how can we be held accountable for our actions from all perspectives, both long-term and short-term?
Urban planning is in many ways a slow, ongoing process in the constant production and negotiation of ‘what is the city’. Perhaps we also need to see accountability as a process, a continuous transparent evaluation of the sustainability discourse and the Agenda 2030-related work. The exposure of goal conflicts is a good start, but we must continue to strive towards productive struggle between different perspectives. Not to reach consensus, rather to acknowledge how we are accountable for the effects and outcomes of sustainability discourses.
[1] Boverket. (2016). Boverkets redovisning av uppdrag till statliga myndigheter att bidra med underlag för Sveriges genomförande av Agenda 2030. Stockholm: Boverket.
[2] Region Skåne. (2018). En analys av relationen mellan Det öppna Skåne 2030 och Agenda 2030. Malmö: Region Skåne
[3] Nordregio. (2019). Globala mål för lokala prioriteringar: Agenda 2030 på lokal nivå. 2019: 5. Stockholm: Nordregio.
This blog post is part of the series Accountability and the SDGs. On 14 October at 17.00-18.30 we continue the discussion on this topic in a panel discussion, which is part of the Lund University Future Week.
Posted on 9 October 2020 by Juan Ocampo (Department of Business Administration/Sten K. Johnson Centre for Entrepreneurship)
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.
The sustainable development agenda has a special focus on people in vulnerable conditions. Adger and Winkels[1] argue that in order for development to be sustainable it is important to address the underlying components in vulnerable societies. Vulnerability is a complex concept that embeds different dimensions, some of them including aspects such as social relations, capabilities, assets, and social exclusion[2]. In consequence, it is worth analyzing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), from a vulnerability perspective.
Using SDG wrapping as a point of departure, it is of interest in this document to reflect on some of the SDG indicators, specifically those with a focus on (digital) financial systems, which include banking, and credit availability (i.e Target 8.10). Financial systems support communities in (re)producing, distributing and accessing goods and services. Therefore, Target 8.10 could be interpreted as an attempt to stimulate the local markets through financial services. This interpretation of the underlying objective of the target, allows for exploring, or perhaps forking, alternatives that support the economic system and can be better held accountable for how they address vulnerable communities.
An example of a financially inclusive solution coming from the business sector is micro-credits. Through this, financial service banks offer poor people access to cash liquidity but might also lock people in debt loops. From a vulnerability and resilience perspective, it is worth questioning if giving people access to credits is really building resilience capabilities or if these businesses are perpetuating vulnerability. Are the current targets of financial inclusion just a way of wrapping (framing) unsustainable practices into more “marketable” ones?
An alternative coming from the grassroots is Complementary Currencies (CC), which are social technologies that create complementary monetary systems and aim to have economic and social benefits in the communities. CC can be designed for different purposes, for example to tackle social exclusion and unemployment, localize economies, and build social capital and civic commitment[3]. Today, several organizations are introducing digital CC in vulnerable communities, thus making them an interesting alternative for sustainable development. Surprisingly, they won’t necessarily have an impact on achieving the SDGs since this financial instrument won’t increase the number of ATMs in a region, or raise the amount of bank accounts in a community, which are the basic indicators for the financial inclusion component in the SDGs.
CC leverages the strength of the local social, economic, and political infrastructures, therefore, to implement this social technology, it is important to develop the capabilities of the target communities. This process of implementation, financial, self-organization and social capabilities being developed, allows us to envision a potential increase in the community’s adaptive capacity, and hopefully a decrease in the community’s vulnerability. It is out of the scope of this document to describe in detail how these CC are being implemented, however, in line with the objective of this document, some reflections about how actors account for their implementation process might be in place.
The development of CC is a complex endeavor that requires the interaction of different collective actors. Figure 1 presents four possible actors that interact in the development of the CC for development. These are: communities, donors/impact investors, facilitators, and observers (i.e Civil Society, NGO, Academia). Based on Fligstein and MacAdam[4] (2011), it is possible to argue that these collective actors, “interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field (including who has power and why), and the field’s rules”.
Figure 1. Different fields of accountability
Source: Own elaboration inspired by Strategic Action Fields.
Actors are embedded in complex webs of fields[5] thus, are accountable to different stakeholders[6]. To construct these accountability frames, donors, facilitators, communities and observers make use of different frame constructs in the micro, meso, and macro level[7]. In this framing construction, accounting becomes an interpretative art[8] with a major role in shaping reality in order to create and maintain stable social worlds[9].
Accountancy becomes a construction of narratives in which hard numbers and soft language come to interplay. Digital currencies open the opportunity to represent performance both through the use of numbers, measures and statistics of impact, and through textualizations and contextualization of these numbers[10]. For example, facilitators frame strategic actions by highlighting the number of people that are being supported through the CC and developing emotional stories about why their solution is relevant to the world. Donors can communicate the number of people that are now eating “warm meals” thanks to their funds, attracting donors or impact investors. In one of the sessions held by the facilitators to train the community in implementing a CC, a community member claimed, “we will spend, spend, spend”, as an act of commitment to the project and thus increasing the number of local transactions to later be seen in the data. Finally, we the Observers, with our inquiry lenses analyze, reflect, discuss, make sense of these numbers, pictures, and texts. Through our knowledgeable accounts, we aim to inform the world about what is happening out there in reality.
The question that motivated this document asked, “how does the SDG increase and/or shape accountability in the relevant field”? Well, they don’t. The accounts that the different actors develop, are constructing, redefining and contesting what the SDG are. The different CC actors transform (or wrap perhaps) the meaning of sustainability through their actions and later shape reality through their framing accounts. Realities, that hopefully, address the underlying components of vulnerability.
[1] W. Neil Adger & Alexandra Winkels, 2014. “Vulnerability, poverty and sustaining well- being,” Chapters, in: Giles Atkinson & Simon Dietz & Eric Neumayer & Matthew Agarwala (ed.), Handbook of Sustainable Development, chapter 13, pages 206-216, Edward Elgar Publishing.
[2] Adger, W. N. (2006). Vulnerability. Global Environmental Change, 16(3), 268–281. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.02.006; FAO, “AnalysIng Resilience for better targeting and action” (2016); Frankenberger, T., Mueller M., Spangler T., and Alexander S. October 2013. Community Resilience: Conceptual Framework and Measurement Feed the Future Learning Agenda. Rockville, MD: Westat
[3] Smith, A., Fressoli, M., & Thomas, H. (2014). Grassroots innovation movements: challenges and contributions. Journal of Cleaner Production, 114-124
[4] Fligstein, N., & MacAdam, D. (2012). A theory of fields. New York: Oxford University Press.
[6] Lounsbury, M., M. Ventresca & Hirsch, P.M. 2003. Social movements, field frames and industry emergence: a cultural–political perspective on US recycling. Socio-economic Review, 1: 71–104
[7] Joep P. Cornelissen & Mirjam D. Werner (2014) Putting Framing in Perspective: A Review of Framing and Frame Analysis across the Management and Organizational Literature, The Academy of Management Annals, 8:1, 181-235, DOI: 10.1080/19416520.2014.875669
[8] Morgan, G. 1988. Accounting as reality construction: towards a new epistemology for accounting practice. Accounting, Organizations & Society, 13, 477-485.
[9] Fligstein, N., & MacAdam, D. (2012). A theory of fields. New York: Oxford University Press.
[10] Sandell N. & Svensson, P (2014). The Language of Failure: The Use of Accounts in Financial Reports International Journal of Business Communication
This blog post is part of the series Accountability and the SDGs. On 14 October at 17.00-18.30 we continue the discussion on this topic in a panel discussion, which is part of the Lund University Future Week.
Posted on 7 October 2020 by Soo-hyun Lee (Faculty of Law)
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.
One of the main challenges in international economic law (IEL) has been in dealing with conflict between inconsistent objectives. For instance, at one end, the objective of IEL is to promote and facilitate economic interaction and integration. At the other end, many of the instruments and institutions at the centre of IEL identify the larger objective of contributing to commonly held objectives like sustainable development[1]. However, increased flows of trade, investment, and development finance may be accompanied by detrimental effects on the SDGs, such as increased economic inequality, indebtedness, or usage of skewed production-consumption throughputs. It is amidst this conundrum that the SDGs assume an important role in IEL accountability upgrading.
This inconsistency is arbitrated through international dispute settlement mechanisms. Governments reserve the authority to apply regulation, even if such measures may undermine the agreements made to trade or investment partners, whether they are other governments or transnational corporations. Exercising this right, however, must be on behalf of legitimate objectives, such as public health[2], or under the duress of extraordinary circumstances like financial crises[3]. The broad spectrum of legitimate objectives easily overlaps with SDG targets, making them normatively available options as grounds for exception to IEL obligations. Enter SDG accountability: there is a need for a reliable means to differentiate instances when states or transnational corporations take measures that actually advance sustainable development from those that are SDG-wrapped pleasantries[4].
An IEL dispute settlement institution is not an appropriate forum for attempting to assess the extent to which a government or corporate decision is sustainable. However, they are appropriate means to ensure that such assessments take place[5], which serve as the basis for determining the legitimacy of an objective. The rigour of those assessments to prevent abusive practices like SDG-wrapping become, in part, the accountability vanguard of the SDGs in IEL. SDG accountability must ensure that the crucial aspect of legitimate exceptions in IEL continues to serve its purpose as a safeguard rather than a loophole to ensure its continued relevance. Deciding when in the process of an IEL dispute and where in the body of IEL such SDG accountability is most tenable remains an ambitious project for institutions[6],multilateralism[7], and international economic agreements[8].
[1] The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (“WTO Agreement”) states in its preamble the observation of the “objective of sustainable development” while seeking a “more integrated […] multilateral trading system”, which has been observed as an inconsistency between the process of trade liberalization and sustainable development, particularly in relation to trade-restrictive measures (Peter van den Bossche and Marie Denise Prévost, Essentials of WTO Law [CUP 2016] 83–84).
[2] Philip Morris Asia Ltd v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (17 December 2015).
[3] LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc.v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (3 October 2006) ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (3 October 2006).
[4] For a brief overview in connection to international portfolio investment, see Soo-hyun Lee, ‘The Need for Policy Integration in Responsible Investment and Environmental Justice’ (21 November 2019) <https://agenda2030.blogg.lu.se/the-need-for-policy-integration-in-responsible-investment-and-environmental-justice/> accessed 20 May 2020.
[5] The occurred involving a scientific review on environmental impact in Methanex v. United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award (3 August 2005).
[6] On the use of accountability mechanisms in regional development banks, for instance, see Domenico Pauciulo, ‘Remarks on the Practice of Regional Development Banks’ (RDBs) Accountability Mechanisms and the Safeguard of Human Rights’ in Giovanna Adinolfi and others (eds), International Economic Law: Contemporary Issues (Springer International Publishing 2017).
[7] The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is currently facilitating such negotiations (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), ‘Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform | United Nations Commission On International Trade Law’ [Working Groups] <https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state> accessed 20 May 2020).
[8] The preamble of the CPTPP, for instance, identifies a reaffirmation of ‘the importance of promoting corporate social responsibility, cultural identity and diversity, environmental protection and conservation, gender equality, indigenous rights, labour rights, inclusive trade, sustainable development and traditional knowledge, as well as the importance of preserving their right to regulate in the public interest’ (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 2018 para vi).
This blog post is part of the series Accountability and the SDGs. On 14 October at 17.00-18.30 we continue the discussion on this topic in a panel discussion, which is part of the Lund University Future Week.
Posted on 5 October 2020 by Lina Van Dooren (Malmö Academy of Music)
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.
Over the past decades the emergence of standardized curricula and tests in western compulsory schooling have ensured that progress in ‘core’ subjects such as science, mathematics and literacy can be measured on a local, national and international level. One such example is the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), an instrument to assess grade 8 students’ performance in core subjects, conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)[1]. These particular subjects are emphasized in a neoliberal educational theory as they lend themselves more easily to quantitative measurement and have a higher application rate in the labor market[2].
In Sweden, the ‘national tests’ [nationella prov] assess students’ knowledge and skills in mathematics, science, literacy and social studies in order to inform and support the teachers in their instruction. The standardized curricula and tests provide an account of how schools meet their responsibilities and are a means to improve education systems. However, different accountability approaches serve different educational contexts and needs[3]. Subjects like the arts may not benefit from and are often not standardized in compulsory education and require different means for accountability.
With the implementation of the 2030 Agenda into national curricula and policies, accountability has become even more multifaceted. According to target 4.7 in the Agenda, all learners should acquire the knowledge and skills for a global citizenship and sustainable development education[4]. Learning about pressing global issues, and the plurality of contexts and ethical considerations that define them, will require close supervision of the interactions between students and teachers in the classroom[5]. For example, the appreciation for cultural diversity as described in target 4.7 can be related to a discourse on multicultural music education[6].
Even though the discourse cannot be described in detail here, one may still start to grasp the complexity of measuring and assigning accountability in (music) education today. How do we measure the appreciation of cultural diversity in music students? What kind of outcomes or classroom practices would indicate successful achievement? The Global Education Monitoring Report Team mentions in one of its key findings that “to accomplish the larger shared aims of education, policy-makers must recognize actors’ interdependence and work towards systems that incorporate mutual accountability approaches”. Thus, accountability systems should not only raise questions like how and what, but also who is involved in the process[7]. The criteria for a successful music education set by students, teachers, parents, policy makers, researchers, and organizations may all be very different – but whose voice is the loudest?
[1] Kertz-Welzel, A. (2018). Globalizing Music Education: A Framework. Indiana University Press.
[2] Horsley, S. (2009). The politics of public accountability: Implications for centralized music education policy development and implementation. Arts Education Policy Review, 110(4), 6–13. https://doi.org/10.3200/AEPR.110.4.6-13
[3] Global Education Monitoring Report Team. (2017). Accountability in education: meeting our commitments; Global education monitoring report, 2017/8. In Educational Administration Quarterly (2nd ed.). United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. https://doi.org/10.1177/0013161X7401000101
[4] United Nations. (2015). Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030 Agenda for Sustainable Development web.pdf
[5] Sund, L., & Pashby, K. (2018). “Is it that We Do Not Want them to have washing machines?”: Ethical global issues pedagogy in swedish classrooms. Sustainability, 10(10), Article 3552. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103552
[6] Elliott, D. J. (1989). Key Concepts in Multicultural Music Education. International Journal of Music Education, 13, 11–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/025576148901300102; Karlsen, S. (2017). Policy, Access, and Multicultural (Music) Education. In P. Schmidt & R. Colwell (Eds.), Policy and the Political Life of Music Education (pp. 211–230). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190246143.001.0001; Sæther, E. (2008). When minorities are the majority: voices from a teacher/researcher project in a multicultural school in Sweden. Research Studies in Music Education, 30(1), 25–42. https://doi.org/10.1177/1321103×08089888; Westerlund, H. M. (2019). The return of moral questions: expanding social epistemology in music education in a time of super-diversity. Music Education Research, 21(5), 503–516. https://doi.org/10.1080/14613808.2019.1665006
[7] For more information in the field music education, see inter alia Barrett, M. S. (2017). Policy and the Lives of School-Age Children Margaret. In P. Schmidt & R. Colwell (Eds.), Policy and the Political Life of Music Education (pp. 175–190). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190246143.001.0001; Schmidt, P. K. (2012). Critical Leadership and Music Educational Practice. Theory Into Practice, 51(3), 221–228. https://doi.org/10.1080/00405841.2012.690313
This blog post is part of the series Accountability and the SDGs. On 14 October at 17.00-18.30 we continue the discussion on this topic in a panel discussion, which is part of the Lund University Future Week.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.
The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a set of 17 ambitious global goals that aim to transform the future of our planet, create an inclusive society and a sustainable global economy. In 2015, all 193 UN member states adopted the goals and promised to do everything in their power to lay the blueprint for a sustainable future by 2030. After a five-year adjustment period that allowed us to come to terms with this aspiring new world order, 2020 marked the beginning of a decade of action.
With much fanfare, the UN secretary-General called on all world leaders and global citizens to “accelerate sustainable solutions to all the world’s biggest challenges” to reach the future we want in 2030.
The decade of action is hoping to create an “unstoppable movement forward” and “supercharge ideas to solutions”5 to propel us toward the future we want. Sounds exciting, right. But with all this focus on the future, all this emphasis on moving forward, we risk forgetting one minor detail: the past.
Since the “First Development Decade” in the 1960s, the United Nations and global development partners have been working to eradicate poverty and improve economic, social and environmental conditions for all.
Even within these narrow parameters of “International Development” (not to mention pre-UN times), there has been 60 years of efforts to create a better future. Throughout this period, International Development has been dominated by the World Bank and a few key UN organs including IMF, UNDP, and FAO. Considering these organs are still some of the biggest players in the International Development, it begs the question: what solutions have they offered in the past and why are these not being “supercharged”?
Where is the Accountability?
The answer lies, in part, in the lack of accountability structures. Development, be it of the ‘Sustainable’ or ‘International’ variety, is a complicated world in which multinational organs, governments and NGOs converge, all bringing their own political agendas and expectations. Because there is such a complex mix of actors, no single actor wants to take full accountability for a project or solution. Accountability structures often get diluted in the negotiations. The SDGs were no exception: the initial ‘monitoring and accountability’ section got diluted down to ‘follow-up and review’.
The same can be said for individual interventions (or “solutions” if you will). The history of development is littered with failed interventions funded by these big players. And thanks to the lack of accountability, the “beneficiaries” of the intervention are left with the burden. Given most of these interventions target impoverished communities in the Global South, the burden just compounds the factors already keeping them in poverty.
Invasive Species and Precarious Lives
Let’s take a case in point. In the 1980s, the FAO introduced a new species of tree, Prosopis Juliflora, to the arid region of Northern Kenya.
Brought in from Chile, this hardy tree was supposed to be a miracle cure that would reverse deforestation, degradation and provide a crucial source of fuel-energy. In reality, this invasive species spread like wildfire, suffocating the indigenous flora and malnourishing the livestock that were left with no alternative food source. The invasive species is still proliferating today causing a serious impediment to the livelihoods of local pastoralists.
And the FAO is nowhere to be seen. Because of their lack of accountability structures, there has been no follow up and corrective measure for this injustice; the local community has been left to suffer the consequences whilst the FAO marches onwards into its new role as SDG custodian.
With such a blinkered focus on finding new solutions and accelerating them into the future, there is a real risk of ignoring the past. Of course, not all interventions have been failures; the world has never had more people not in poverty, which can be partly attributed to the work of UN organs. This cannot be ignored either.
History can teach us important lessons, it can show us what has been done well and what we ought to avoid going forward. But more than that, our present and future are alive with the actions of the past; the world we live in today is a construction of the world we created yesterday. We cannot leave the actions of the past in the past. Accountability for past interventions needs to be addressed before we supercharge into the future. And, if we truly want to leave no one behind, they need to be addressed today, as an integral part of the current global agenda.
This blog post is part of the series Accountability and the SDGs. On 14 October at 17.00-18.30 we continue the discussion on this topic in a panel discussion, which is part of the Lund University Future Week.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.
The Sustainable Development Goals outline a “shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet, now and into the future”. However, this is not only ambitious; there appear to be inherent contradictions to reconciling the economic, environmental, and social goals. Goal 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions relies on the promotion of “sustainable development” to achieve environmental and social goals. The idea of sustainable development is deeply connected to economic growth. While there are benefits to economic growth, like for example decreased risk of conflict, this approach is reactive rather than transformative. Therefore, there is a need to reimage sustainable development as a transformative process in society to fight not only social and economic inequalities, but also climate change vulnerabilities. We suggest that degrowth ideas open key opportunities for environmental peacebuilding, such that peacebuilding processes might foster more peaceful societies as well as help communities address climate change.
Combining environment and peacebuilding
Environmental peacebuilding, recently embraced by the international community, is a field of research and practice that suggests that cooperation on environmental issues can address violent conflict as well as social and structural inequality – strong causes of conflict. Many countries said to face the greatest climate vulnerability also experience armed civil conflict. The UN General Assembly has stressed that post-conflict countries and those with limited natural resources will be greatly impacted by climate change. Environmental peacebuilding allows the possibility of simultaneously considering challenges of building peace and addressing climate change.
Evidence (e.g. here and here) shows that although environmental peacebuilding efforts often call for climate sensitivity, the field has largely focused on economic growth, prioritizing resource extraction, economic recovery, and livelihood creation in post-conflict contexts. Despite some benefits, economic growth comes under critique for inadequacies in light of persisting global challenges such as suffering planetary health, rising global inequalities, and even the stagnation of human well-being in relation to growth after a certain threshold (e.g. here and here).
This dissonance between goals of environmental peacebuilding and reliance on economic growth poses a challenge for sustainable peace. If environmental peacebuilding strategies rely on economic growth and post-conflict economic recovery in order to facilitate peace, this approach may be impractical and potentially harmful in light of climate change. Moreover, relying on economic growth for building peace perpetuates a system that leads to conflict in the first place: reproducing environmental injustice, unequal access to natural resources, inadequate accounts for indigenous land rights, and social inequalities. If environmental peacebuilding aims to foster peace in relation to environmental issues – both to enhance resilience to climate impacts and avoid further contributing to harmful climate change – aligning peacebuilding with climate action should take priority.
What alternatives?
If environmental peacebuilding should account for climate change, there seems to be potential in moving beyond reliance on economic growth. For example, environmental peacebuilding might gain lessons from degrowth proposals. Degrowth is a field of political and social action and philosophical ideas about transitioning to a new economic model focused on justice and sustainability, instead of economic growth. Degrowth proposals focus on equal distribution of wealth, resources, and power combined with downscaling of throughputs. Energy and material production and consumption would decrease, leading to a decline in natural resource and labor use in line with climate limitations.
Degrowth proposals take many forms. They might look like progressive taxes to enforce maximum and minimum income and wealth, job guarantees, reduced work hours, community currencies, or voluntary activities. In such a society, care, education, health, and environmental services would be restored and prioritized; credit and money transitioned to public rather than private entities; and ‘green’ sectors prioritized alongside fossil fuel divestment.
Including degrowth approaches in environmental peacebuilding could help promote a sustainable and inclusive peace. Building sustainable peace should not only entail an absence of violence, but also processes to transform unsustainable processes and structures that allow for the emergence of conflict in the first place. Promoting peace that strives for development through economic growth and continued exploration of natural resources poses major questions to the natural limits of the planet and exacerbates situations of environmental injustice and vulnerabilities to climate change.
For peace to be sustainable and inclusive, it must promote democratic representation, fair and equal distribution of resources in the society, and care for the environment. This kind of peace is based on a notion of well-being rather than economic productivity. By connecting degrowth and environmental peacebuilding, it is possible to close the gap between the present structural issues, and to foster an equal and inclusive society that thrives under sustainable peace.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.
This piece started as a post in my research journal. I’ve turned it into a blog in the humble hope that it offers solace to other researchers who are struggling to stay afloat in the current pandemic.
I normally write in my research journal on a daily basis, using it as an opportunity to gather my thoughts and track the progress of my research. Ever since the Covid-19 pandemic took hold of the world though, I have avoided my journal entirely, not writing a single entry. And I’ve been accompanied by a constant niggle at the back of my mind that “as a researcher, I should really be recording this shit”.
Gradually this niggle grew and started disrupting my sleep until, one day in the small hours of the morning before the world woke up, I confronted my journal. What started as an apology for my neglect gradually turned into a cathartic reflection on my circumstances.
It’s been a while since I last made a journal input. Sorry. The coronavirus pandemic has really disrupted my research process and thrown me completely off kilter. When the pandemic first started to affect us in Sweden 2 months ago I had to take a lot of time off to look after Louie (my 18 month old). He had a cold and a fever so had to stay away from nursery as a precautionary measure. This coincided with my fieldwork being disrupted and ultimately cancelled. The disruptions were compounded by an inability to work effectively, trying to balance full-time childcare with crisis management of a PhD project that was falling apart before it had really begun.
Since the beginning of my PhD last year, everything was working towards my first fieldtrip to Kenya in April. I had planned the whole thing beautifully, seamlessly orchestrating the innumerable moving parts to come together under one (admittedly ambitious) fieldtrip. This was to be the foundation of my research upon which subsequent fieldtrips would build.
And then came a pandemic.
When it became clear that this fieldtrip was impossible (Kenya closed their borders on 15th March), I set about trying to re-orient and re-think my entire PhD project. This included multiple plans based on different scenarios. Throughout this, I was also reading for a new course, writing funding applications and preparing to teach online. For 8 weeks or so I was juggling parenting, numerous sweeping project reforms, human rights literature, funding applications, endless zoom meetings and an ever-present worry for my family in lockdown in UK.
Looking back, it really was a disabling process; I was barely able to manage from day-to-day, let alone reform my entire PhD project. Developing my original PhD project took months of planning, innumerable conversations with supervisors and, crucially, a lot of deep thought. Not only did I lack time, I just did not have the intellectual space for such a task. I was drowning in a proverbial pool of daily life and all my energy went into to staying afloat. My mind was dominated by trying to rationalise to an 18 month old that it is his duty as a global citizen not to play on the swings. As Malmö University PhD students succinctly put it in an open letter: “We are not working from home, we’re at home during a crisis trying to work”.
Eventually, I came out of this crisis mode with a short-term plan to write a historical account of the region I am studying in Northern Kenya. This plan would get me through the spring term and seemed like the most feasible plan considering all the uncertainty.
Still, I find that urge to “record this shit” present at the back of my mind. I would like to document the effects of the pandemic in Northern Kenya but, realistically, any documentation from abroad is going to be extremely limited. Poor network coverage, limited technological literacy among my informants, and restricted movement for research assistants make it extremely difficult to get quality data on the situation. The best I can do is keep in touch with a few close contacts I have in the area and follow the local news coverage.
So, I have started reading and taking notes for my historical account. Having a single focus has really helped me get back on track. Of course, it feels odd – and disappointing – not being able to cover this pandemic in-depth, or go to Kenya and submerge myself in the ethnographic experience. But, what can I do!?
At the beginning of the lockdown, my brother gave me some advice in a manner only a big brother can: “it’s okay not to be productive in a fucking global pandemic. Chill out.”
I think I’m only just starting to understand what he was saying. Realistically, keeping a narrow focus in my research is the best I can hope for just now. Once the world starts opening up again and some semblance of normality resumes, I can dive back into my fieldwork and explore this brave new world of ours.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.
This blog post is based on a seminar on sustainable urbanization, arranged for the core group of the Agenda 2030 graduate school. Three cases were used as basis for the discussion (figure 1), and for each case, the following questions were asked: (1) What are the biggest challenges with urbanization? (2) How do we achieve sustainable urbanization? (3) Do you see any conflicts or synergies between different interests when striving for sustainable urbanization?
Fig. 1 Basic criteria for the three cases
Discovering interdependencies
The discussions from all three groups made visible all kinds of factors, reflecting our variety in expertise and perspective. Some factors were purely technical, such as how old piping systems in the growing city in North America could cope up with the pressure from increased usage. Other factors targeted were social issues, such as the spatial segregation caused by the elite building gated communities fenced off from the slum areas in case 1 focusing on global south. The differentiated set of, seemingly unrelated, issues sometimes made the setting seem impossibly complex.
Although, when we took a closer look at these factors, we were able to find interdependencies between seemingly unrelated perspectives. For instance, the increased demands for mobility (e.g. in case 3 about the summer city in Sweden) within and beyond regions, create a pressure to expand the infrastructure in an energy efficient way, but also to find mobility solutions that are accessible for all segments of the population. If we allow “sustainable heterotopias”[1], for example discussed as gated communities in the global south-case, we cannot look past effects such as waste and sewage pipes leading straight to the slum areas, seriously adventuring the already troubling sanitary standards. We need to address the issues of sustainability, not just transfer problems to marginalized places and people.
The main challenge thus lies within the question we asked – to create synergies, we also need to identify conflicts. The city is a complex system that cannot be broken into “islands of sustainability”. Social matters must be attended if technical solutions ought to be well-functioning, and vice versa. The group discussing case 2, global north, stated that “the level of environmental awareness goes down the rougher conditions you live in. Where there is no stable electricity, people will not care about environmental concerns”.
Suggesting solutions
So, which solutions were discussed? All three groups engaged with the topic of equitable blue-green structures, increasing urban green elements. Nature contributes to basic needs such as the air we breathe and the food we eat but is rarely prioritized. Green elements provide environmental and social benefits, and these benefits need to favour all parts of the city and all segments of the population. The discussion about the green city must relate to matters such as urban design and urban economy; how do we balance the potential conflict between densification and greenery? Who benefits from this greenery and how could we make a joint venture to care for it?
The second dominating solution discussed was inclusivity and participation. Governmental approaches and politics undoubtedly are a crucial part of the urban construction, therefore more people need to access democratic governance through inclusive participation. Group 1, focusing on global south, stated that “the political system is the basis of the sustainable city. We need regulation to become environmentally and socially sustainable – although the challenge does not lie within achieving regulation but to establish these changes and get acceptance of them”.
Finding the pathway towards sustainable urbanization includes asking ourselves the question: in what kind of society do we want to live? It is a complex question and a complex theme that greatly benefitted from the interdisciplinary discussion that happened during the seminar. Each person in the group brought their own expertise and interest to the table, which made challenges and conflicts visible. Doing it together, not only within academia but also with the civil society, government and policy, might be the only way to do it.
Fig 2. Being together, although apart – discussions about urbanization through online video conference.
[1] Heterotopia is a concept developed by Foucualt but used by many. We use it in this text to conceptualize discursive places of transformative potential, separate spaces of ‘otherness’ within a lifeworld.
Photo by mana5280 on Unsplash. Smithsonian Museum of Natural History, Washington DC.
Posted on 12 May 2020 by Juan Ocampo. I would like to thank Anna Stubbendorff for the content in regard to food security; I take responsibility for the rest.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.
Entry 2
This post is part of the blog series Times of crisis: Interdisciplinary series and is composed by collaborative posts, informative videos and a discussion episode. Each content can be read or watched independently, which means they don´t follow a specific narrative thread or are prerequisites for understanding the whole series. However, if it catches your interest we recommend you to read and watch them all you will get a more holistic perspective of a creative, but researched based, exercise. If you find it interesting you are welcome to watch the complete product and please comment or reach out.
You can find the complete second episode of the series Times of crisis: Interdisciplinary stories here, and Anna Stubbendorff’s presentation in regard to Food Security here. Feel free to comment and reach out.
It was six [wo]men of Indostan, To learning much inclined, Who went to see the Elephant (Though all of them were blind), That each by observation Might satisfy his mind
John Godfrey Saxe’s (1816-1887) version of Blind Men and the Elephant
During the process of using data to observe different perspectives of the COVID-19 crisis, several questions in regard to health and nutrition were raised. Without any experience in the topic, we felt the need of a more experienced mind, but where could we find someone with this knowledge? The answer was inside the Agenda2030 Graduate School. This is the story of how we collaborated with Anna Stubbendorff.
The collaboration with Anna started with a coffee under the sun, one of the advantages of being in Sweden during these uncertain times. Even though each country had a different way of approaching the issue, one of the interesting circumstances under the COVID-19 is that it has crossed the frontiers between the North and the South, making it an issue where no one (and this time really no one) could be left behind. Death only has frontiers in Jose Saramago’s books, and during this pandemic, for many, death becomes an elephant in the room.
While we shared with Anna the reflections in regard to unemployment, undernourishment and morbidity, I understood the importance of including her expertise in the discussion. The initial idea of linking nutrition with morbidity was to be able to “compare”, so to speak, health and economic aspects during the crisis. This was meant to be made by observing the effect that undernourishment had on the morbidity rates of populations in risk. However, what we learned from Anna, is that this is just a consequence of a much complex problem; this is when I found a second elephant in the room.
Anna reflected on the different effects that a crisis had in undernourishment, specifically through food security. The lack of food security increases the risk of malnutrition, morbidity and mortality, thus for people infected by Covid-19 good nutrition might make the difference between life and death. The concept of food security is based on 4 pillars: (i) the availability of food, (ii) the access of food, (iii) the utilisation of food, and, (iv) the stability of the previous three pillars. As Anna explained, the food supply chain (FSC) is a complex web that involves several processes and stakeholders and, as the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) has pointed out, the FSC will be tested during this COVID-19 times.
As the virus spreads around the world there are countless ways the food system can be affected. FAO stated that “We risk a food crisis unless measures are taken fast to protect the most vulnerable, keep global food supply chains alive and mitigate the pandemic’s impacts across the food system.” To prevent a crisis, we need to understand how the pandemic might affect the food system and which groups are of greatest risk of food security. Food security is threatened by COVID-19 in different ways. Restriction in transportation, border closures and quarantines led to both labour shortages at harvest time, whilst other farmers were unable to bring their produce to the market. Moreover, the access to sufficient/diverse and nutritious sources of food might decrease because of disruptions in the food supply chain. Hopefully this can be prevented during the pandemic.
During this crisis, there are several actors that have higher risks along the supply chain. From an economic perspective, small-scale farmers, pastoralists, fishers, or informal laborers might not be able to work on their land or get supplies. But also, let’s think about the countries going through other crises like desert locusts’ outbreak in the Horn of Africa, the insecurity in Yemen, Colombia or Syria, or the refugee’s camps. And the list could go on and on. Was this another elephant in the room?
The FAO has suggested several ways on how countries should prepare for this crisis. For example, by boosting their social protection programs via social assistance, use of food banks and facilitate donations from individuals, NGOs and others. Likewise, governments should also inject funds in agriculture and small business and enable mobile payment systems to prevent disruptions in food supply chains. Digital technologies have a role to play to facilitate the interface between supply and demand, which could be helpful in trade of perishable products, fruit, vegetables and seafood.
The COVID-19 crisis will have effects in many aspects of our daily lives. Health, economy, education, and privacy are just some of the different parts of this complex world we live in. Ironically, it is just when we look closer at a problem, as the blind people in the story, that we start to make sense of the many elephants in the room. Or at least I hope so.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.
The Agenda 2030 Graduate School offers various platforms and avenues to explore, discuss, criticize and raise awareness of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This spring semester, the graduate school offered a course that focused on Goal 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities. In the course, the participants were divided into groups, which were then assigned to discuss themes related to Goal 11 – life, society, and transition.
As a requirement, each group was tasked to interview experts from different fields and ask them how their studies are related to the SGDs, particularly to Goal 11, and the respective themes. All groups then had the opportunity to conduct three public panel discussions with 9 experts from the LTH (Faculty of Engineering), Faculty of Social Science, and Faculty of Medicine. Due to the ongoing pandemic, however, we were compelled to hold these discussions online via Zoom.
In this blog post, we, Alva, Maria, and Phil, enumerate our key learnings from the course and how we relate these learnings to our projects.
Key lessons
We take away several key lessons from the course. First, we realized the presence of synergies and conflicts between different interests when planning cities and communities. For example, how does energy efficiency of buildings affect rental prices? Or how do green areas affect biodiversity and health? These are only some questions that we have to face in order to build more sustainable cities and communities in the future. It is natural that tradeoffs and sacrifices have to be made. We just have to remember that we need to think of and plan for the future generations and not only for ourselves.
Second, we as a society need to transform as a whole and cooperation between societal actors is crucial to move towards sustainability. This theme of collaboration was touched upon in all three debates, perhaps because of its genuine relevance to sustainability. There is a need for all actors to work together as this correlates with policy and governance of public-private partnerships. We have to remember that sustainability is not only a responsibility of one member of the society, but instead it is the accountability of the government, the private sector, and individuals.
Third, we quote one of our invited speakers, Anna Oudin, “we need to fund flexible research since most of the world’s greatest discoveries was made by accident.” We would like to conduct our research in such an exploratory manner, i.e., we are not constrained to the goals we set at the beginning of projects, rather we are open to ideas and results that may bring more meaning to our research.
Finally, we learned through a consensus in one of the panel discussions that we are only constantly looking at the short-term perspective. We always want to have high returns with low investments, i.e. we invest in cheap projects that show quick results. However, these usually are not the optimal types of investments for cities and communities to become sustainable.
Relating key lessons to our projects
Alva
My own research project was, and still is, under formation while taking this course. For now, I would like to say that I am working on combining the (material) perspectives of economic degrowth and intersectional feminism, exploring marginalized socio-spatial practices of social reproduction. Such practices are often considered domestic and thus rendered invisible in public space. I was in great luck to have my group producing a panel debate on the theme of transitions, since degrowth is one of many ‘transition discourses’. Because of the research needed to understand the theme and how to discuss it with each other and our experts, I got to engage with other ‘transition discourses’ such as post-development theory. This context gave me a much stronger sense of why I am interested in degrowth, as well as further defining my particular understanding of it. The exploration of my positioning within degrowth discourse, as I am mostly interested in social perspectives of sustainability and a politicization of this fuzzy concept, was also strengthened through engaging on the topic with students and experts from other areas.
Maria
In the debate regarding Transition, there was a discussion about how context is important in the transition. I think this is very relatable to the Swedish water and wastewater sector. If a municipality or wastewater company will transform to new and potentially more sustainable systems probably depends on different contextual aspects. What first comes to my mind is the climate and the actual freshwater resources. If there is a severe lack of freshwater resources, this might definitely be a driver. However, also other aspects probably affect a transition, such as organization and trends, for example. I have just recently started thinking about including this perspective in my research, as a complement to the more technical parts. I also think the course gave good contacts in other fields that might be useful in the future.
Phil
I am looking at sustainability in the personal transport sector, which relates to the first target of Goal 11. However, I have never considered a holistic approach to my study. My focus was always on the study of consumer behavior and the ways research can influence this. This is definitely good, in the sense that I can concentrate and narrow my specialization. Nevertheless, it somehow narrowed my perspectives and I lost track of the bigger picture. With the insights I have gained from the discussions, I would like to look at my research from the various angles of the members of cities and communities. For instance, I can incorporate more the role of the government in the regulation and restriction of consumer behavior, especially because I am looking at shared transport, which is a novel area. Moreover, I can look at my research from the opposing points of view of different cities or even countries.
Conclusion
Overall, we would highly recommend the course to other PhD students, especially to our fellow Agenda 2030 colleagues. This would definitely open their eyes to more aspects of the Agenda 2030. Although we feel the burden placed on us, and we understand that the more knowledge we have, the more problematic the situation we see ourselves in, nonetheless, we strongly believe that through collaboration and openness we will certainly get to the goals of the Agenda 2030, maybe not in ten years, but hopefully soon after.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.
Entry 1
This post is part of the series Times of crisis and is composed by collaborative posts, informative videos and a discussion episode. Each content can be read or watched independently, which means they don´t follow a specific narrative thread or are prerequisites for understanding the whole series. However, if it catches your interest we recommend you to read and watch them all to get a more holistic perspective of a creative, but researched based, exercise. If you find it interesting you are welcome to watch the complete product and please comment or reach out.
You can find the complete episode of the series here, and Santiago’s presentation on the content here. Feel free to comment and reach out. The code for some of the graphs can be found in Santiago’s Github.
What a better start than by looking at what has become a “habit” for many of us during the COVID-19 crisis, looking at time series graphs of COVID-19 cases and the stock market behaviour. The exponential surge in detected cases and the effect the stock market has experienced is shown in Figure 1. The upper graph exposes a high and imminent threat to our health, while that in the bottom impacts our pockets. These two cases show just a few amongst many of the different consequences of the COVID-19 crisis. This collaboration started as a reaction to the global situation and the role that scholars could have in these times, regardless of their/our-own disciplines.
Figure 1 COVID-19 cases shown as a 3-day moving average (upper panel) and the normalized Dow Jones Industrial average and the Deutscher Aktienindex. Own elaboration based on data from ourworldindata.org and Yahoo Finance.
Two of the authors of this blog post come from Colombia, a country with many social and economic struggles that has been placed under more stress during this pandemic. In some way we felt challenged by being far from our country and not being able to contribute, in some way, to the discussion that was being held. We then decided to do what we are good at: research.
Reflecting on how the spread of the COVID-19 could affect our country we ended in a discussion on how, if even possible, to compare the economy and health. Neither of us are economists or health specialists, so it was not clear where to start. As we both have engineering backgrounds, we decide to rely on what society expects us to be good at: numbers. We started by exploring some economic indicators of countries we thought could be interesting. These were: Italy, which at that time was at its peak of COVID-19 cases; Germany as a North-European example; Canada as a least studied example in North America; Ecuador which is going through an indescribable health management challenge, and, of course, our country Colombia.
Figure 2 Economic baseline of selected countries. Own elaboration based on data retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org
In Figure 2, it is possible to observe some interesting points in regard to the economic context of countries. The above figure shows the Gini index as an indicator for inequality, the GDP per capita reflects the wealth of the country, and finally the health expenditure per capita allows for a comparison in regards to health and economic context. Note that the poorest countries have a higher inequality and less health expenditure per capita, while countries with a lower Gini index showed both a greater GDP and health expenditure per capita.
With an economic baseline drawn, it was now important to look at these countries from a health perspective. Again, drowned in data, websites, and sources we decided to observe some indicators that could give a reference of how “prepared” the selected countries were to respond to the COVID-19 health emergency. Figure 3 exposes the population of the countries and what we labelled health infrastructure, which includes the indicators found in the World Bank data bank and that measure physicians and beds per 1000 inhabitants. From these figures it is possible to observe how a country like Colombia with a population of almost 50M habitants, has less health infrastructure than a country like Canada that is around 35M habitants. Having high population a low health infrastructure is definitely something to consider in this times of crisis where countries that fail to flatten the COVID-19 curve, will see their health infrastructure suffer.
Figure 3 Health baseline of selected countries. Own elaboration based on data retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org
Take a look at the graphs, what do these tell you? If you are thinking about inequality, we agree with you! Even though discussing inequality tempted our spirits, we thought this issue required a whole project by itself. Even though these figures shed some light on the importance of “Leaving no one behind” in times of crisis, unfortunately, these figures didn’t help us much in our economic vs health impact discussion. We needed to reframe our question.
Seeking a new approach, we decided to start again from the beginning: Colombia. First we thought about comparing the deaths of COVID-19 with the thousands of lives Colombians have lost in a conflict with no apparent expiration date, regardless of a recent peace treaty; important but perhaps out of the scope. We then decided to make use of our deduction logic. Stopping the economy and isolating the population had a tremendous effect on everyone’s pocket but more importantly on the low-income population. Colombia had a unemployment rate of ≈9% by 2018, which is not a very good start, but another interesting/worrying fact is that 60% of the Colombian labour population depends on informal employment (≈60% for 2018). Informal employment in developing countries means that people are living on wages that depend on their daily work. Therefore, the isolation measures that the government was pressured to implement/set could lead to a further increase in the unemployment rate. But, is there a clear link between unemployment and health? No, at least it is not crystal clear for us amateurs in the field. We then tried to identify a unit for comparison, and as soulless as numbers tend to be, death became a point of reference. Here we spotted a possible missing link: high unemployment lowers income, which then reduces food access and as a consequence, increases hunger and undernourishment. Seemed reasonable, but how could we test this? Again data.
Santiago´s work is based on analysing huge chunks of atmospheric data coming from the ATTO project, and thus his skill in handling databases and developing analytical visualisations came in handy. As economists have suggested and as suggested in Figure 1, the COVID-19 pandemic is triggering an economic crisis. Thus, as a reference observing how unemployment and income have behaved during times of crisis could be useful to fathom what could come in the foreseeable future (i.e. 1990 recession and 2008 financial crisis). If you look at both graphs, during these previous crises there was a (slight) decrease in income and a clear increase in unemployment. However, keep in mind that this is an “informed” thought experiment rather than a conclusive research, but we have some confidence when we assume that unemployment affects the income of the people. Wouldn’t you think so?
Figure 4. Percent of people unemployed in the age group 25-54 (upper panel) and income per person (GDP/capita). Data download from gapminder.org.
To complete our second economic argument, and aware of the limitations of looking at correlations, we decided to look to what extent unemployment and undernourishment are related. Making any conclusion was more difficult since a relationship between these two variables, we believe, is not linear and depends on the context. In addition, as Figure 4 shows, trends have changed over time. Anyway, we got some interesting observations. First unemployment seems to be completely decoupled from undernourishment in developed countries. Even at unemployment rates, of about 10% Germany managed to keep undernourishment very low. This could be explained by their public policies or just by a lack of data reliability (even though this comes from the world bank databank). For Colombia in the early 2000s the country managed to decrease unemployment rates with little impact on undernourishment. However, from 2010 to 2014, unemployment decreased together with undernourishment and for the last years of record an increase in unemployment did not show impact on undernourishment. For Ecuador, we see some interesting patterns. The country has decreased undernourishment since the beginning of the century, maintaining, in general, a low percentage of unemployment. But there have been periods in which both variables have decreased together like from 2002 to 2006 and from 2008 to 2012. Recently, unemployment rates have increased with almost no impact on undernourishment. However, the data is rather inconclusive and we leave it to our readers to develop their own conclusions.
Figure 5. Prevalence of undernourishment in percentage of population as a function of unemployment rate in the age group 25-54. The numbers show the years for Ecuador and Colombia. Data from gapminder.org. The definition of prevalence of undernourishment can be found here.
Bear with us in our soulless analysis, since it was a thorny analytical path. The COVID-19 is an event that has no precedence and we are all constantly trying to make sense of this. In this entry we tried to make sense of our Colombian background and make use of data to shed some light on what many countries like ours are experiencing. Thinking about health and economy in terms of death, is just a reflection of how soulless data can be.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.
The cross-cutting nature of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School at Lund University seeks to initiate collaboration, move the research front around societal challenges and profiling the university nationally and internationally as a significant player in the global sustainability work. In times of strain and isolation, this series seeks to open a frank and meaningful discussion on the need to not only persevere, but also advance the promise of sustainability.
This series is called: Times of Crisis. Over the last month, world structures were rattled by COVID-19. Adding to the regrettable loss of thousands of lives to the pandemic are the foreboding socioeconomic impacts that are becoming to come to light. To many, the economic impact brought by this pandemic overshadows the health crisis eclipsing humanity. Yet we must not forget that we live in a complex, intertwined world, where economic countermeasures cut across all aspects of life. The predominant shade of that complexity is a much older threat, perhaps one borne with the rise of human civilization: the irreversible need for sustainable development whose stark reminder comes in ever increasing scales of natural disasters – such as COVID-19.
In these entries we examine the sustainable development implications of COVID-19 economic countermeasures around the world to provide insight on how these efforts are moving in parallel or are working against one another.
From the earliest detections of COVID-19, governments around the world have been developing social and economic strategies in response to what would become one of the greatest challenges to healthcare systems known to date. Resilience is important in times of crisis, and observing how governments respond today becomes a point of departure for handling crisis in the future.
However, every country’s COVID-19 situation is different and so are their institutional capabilities and financial resources. Nevertheless, one of the main pledges of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is to “leave no one behind” and in this time of crisis it is important to keep this in mind. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) identified that people, or even countries, are being left behind “when they lack the choices and opportunities to participate in and benefit from development progress”. UNDP identifies the following five key factors in that effort: discrimination, geography, shock and fragility, socioeconomic status, and governance. COVID-19 is challenging each and every one of these dimensions. Reflecting on the structural differences between economies, this post presents two deeply divergent circumstances: Malawi and Canada.
The Case of Malawi
Malawi declared a state of emergency as a countermeasure to COVID-19 from the third week of March. The African nation has been implementing shutdown measures and the mobilization of national security forces to enforce them in ways now being seen in Malaysia, France, and the United States. Malawi set out an approximately 30mn USD Preparedness and Response Plan to help cope with COVID-19’s economic impact and development aid has been flowing into the country. With the help of the United Nations, the country hopes to initiate a social cash transfer programme that empower the most vulnerable populations prepare themselves against shock. However, there are bleak realities facing the least developed countries, LDCs, in the face of natural disasters and their economic fallouts.
The first is the state of health systems, which involves aspects such as governance, financing, delivery and access. The improvement of such systems in Malawi have primarily been on the supply-side: shortages in health workers, facilities and their geographical spread, particularly in rural areas. While Malawians have free access to healthcare for the treatment of major health concerns through the Essential Health Care Package, government expenditure on healthcare per capita is at less than 1/4th of prevalent benchmarks. The Malawi Health Workforce Observatory prepared under the auspices of the Malawi Ministry of Health identified that for every 41,045 people, there is one doctor – significantly lower than the 1:10,000 ratio set by the WHO for the achievement of UN SDG 3c. A COVID-19 outbreak would chip at each of these fragilities in the Malawian healthcare system, which puts particular emphasis on prevention.
The second is the role of economic migrants and international remittances. Working age populations in LDCs often migrate to countries where they may find greater opportunities for work, which in this case is South Africa. When migrant workers return from South Africa, while testing and quarantine are crucial, so is thinking about what happens to interrupted incomes. Migrants are not always on the receiving end of financial countermeasures devised by governments, meaning that indefinite pauses in employment like those we are seeing around the world, are that much more impactful against populations with little financial insulation against that kind of shock – particularly for members of shadow economies.
The third is interrupted supply chains and commodity market fluctuations. Tobacco leaf farming and export remain central aspects of Malawi’s economy at 11% of GDP and 60% of export revenues, but has been delayed due to the virus. Economic disruptions of this kind have lasting impacts, both in the shorter run such as being able to purchase vaccines, as well as in the long run such as ensuring children are able to have continued access to education after the shutdown of schools. This is particularly true in those areas most affected by a digital divide or where working age populations will have the prospects to work and for sustainable reintegration, both domestically and in foreign markets. These sectors are vulnerable to exogenous and commodity price shocks, resulting in vicious cycles powered by falling economic confidence. Such shocks were seen in the recent spat involving the US banning tobacco product from Malawi for the use of child labour.
The fourth is that rattled institutions face tests that are amplified by these extraordinary circumstances. In 2019, Malawi’s Constitutional Court overturned the results of the country’s presidential elections, fueling existing political conflicts with majority and opposition parties. Governance mechanisms are essential to ensuring that public financial and institutional resources are mobilized towards those areas of greatest need, such as testing and treatment, distribution of vital supplies and enforcing good faith government measures designed to counteract the spread of COVID-19.
Events like COVID-19 invariably have a much larger impact on LDCs like Malawi, where interrupting economic activity has much larger consequences in the face of structural or preexisting vulnerabilities. Responding to the earlier mentioned challenges are not unique to and therefore will not end with COVID-19. Systems will remain challenged, if not only by COVID-19, but also existing and continued gaps in progress towards the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Financial measures especially during times of crisis require accountability to ensure responses do not contradict one another, even if those measures may not explicitly be related to COVID-19.
The Case of Canada
COVID-19 doesn’t wait and governments must act accordingly. On January 25th, Canada confirmed its first case of COVID-19, however, by January 15th, the government had activated the Emergency Operation Centre to support Canada’s response. In March 17th, when around 400 cases had been identified, the government declared a state of emergency and was began developing specific regulations to tackle the crisis; one week later the total identified cases rose to 1,400 cases. Compared to countries in which there is not even the possibility to test the population or governments had fail to respond to the situation, it is possible to argue that Canada has acted promptly to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, we must keep in mind that Canada is an OECD member with an estimated GDP per capita of 4,500USD, and a total health expenditure as a percentage of its GDP of 10%.
Based on the 2003 SARS experience, Canada prepared itself for future pandemics. The Canadian government has developed its strategy based on some guiding principles which are: collaboration, evidence-informed decision-making, proportionality, flexibility, a precautionary approach, use of established practices and systems, and ethical decision-making. Based on these principles, Canada aims to protect and inform its population, ensure economic resilience and collaborate with the rest of the world. By the 31st of March, Canada had invested 1101 Million CAD as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Overview of economic measures. Source: author´s projections based on data retrieved from canada.ca the 31st of March, 2020.
The Canadian government issued several social and economic regulations. Regulations in regard to mandatory self-isolation for travelers coming from abroad or people presenting symptoms have been put into place; however, by March 23rd, and even though the Prime Minister had advice people to stay home, there were still no mandatory quarantine measures. In regard to public gatherings, a guideline for “Risk-informed decision-making for mass gatherings during COVID-19 pandemic” was presented, however stating that each case is particular and never specifying a maximum amount of people. However, local governments have developed more strict measures in regard to this.
There are three main groups that have been targeted through several economic measures. Specifically, support for: individuals and families, people facing unemployment, and businesses. Each target group has specific and clear assistances that may include additional incomes, extension in mortgage payments, and access to credits and loans. For example, the work-sharing program which in times of organizational crisis provide benefits to the employees who organize and distribute available working hours amongst them, has been extended from 38 to 76 weeks. Figure 1 presents an overview of the different measures that have been put into place.
Figure 2. Economic measures
As measures for financial stability the government has developed four main benefits. First, the Canadian central bank has lowered the interests in an attempt to increase liquidity. Second, the government is buying uninsured mortgages to provide financial institutions with more liquidity, through the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation. Third, the government has extended the time to pay and report income taxes. And, fourth the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) adjusts the Domestic Stability Buffer lowered the domestic stability buffer requirement from 2% to 1% for key banks. This requirement was supposed to increase to 2.25% level for the end of April, and is basically a measure to give confidence to markets and decrease the impact of the COVID-19 crisis. It is worth noting that this measure was set after 2008 financial crisis and aimed to assure that key banks had saved capital to work in times of crisis.
Every country has its own strategy to cope worth this pandemic crisis, however Canada offer several good practices that should be considered by other countries with less experience or capabilities. There are three main aspects that should be highlighted from how the Canadian governments seems to be handling the situation: (1) The information is complete and easy to access. In times of crisis having clear updates of the relevant information allows citizens to act accordingly and avoid the now common misinformation that travel through the social media. (2) Canada shows the benefits of digitalization in times of crisis. Having a digitalized administration facilitates the way people can interact with the government, apply to benefits and resolves its requirements, this gives confidence to the citizens and might calm citizens already with high level of anxiety. Finally, it is worth noting how the values that the government defined for times of crisis, seem embedded in the actions, packages and communications that the governments is developing. This shows coherence and coordination and should give a part of security to its citizens. For more information in regard to leading in crisis we recommend you the following article by McKinsey.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of any institution.
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