Agenda 2030 Graduate School blog

Lund University Agenda 2030 Graduate School is a global, cutting-edge research school and collaboration platform for issues related to societal challenges, sustainability and the 2030 Agenda. The 17 PhD students from all faculties at Lund University enrolled with the Agenda 2030 Graduate School relate their specific research topics to the Sustainable Development Goals. In this blog the PhD students of the Graduate School discuss topical research and societal issues related to the 2030 Agenda.

Grid View

Sustainable Migration: a tool to counter the EU politics of exclusion?

Hands holding fence. Photo.
Photo by Mitchel Lensink on Unsplash

Posted on 9 April 2020 by Alezini Loxa

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.

Sustainable migration is a powerful rhetorical tool. That is in the sense that the vagueness of the concept allows for it to be used under different political agendas and with divergent implications for human rights protection and migration governance; from utmost respect for all people, to cost and benefit analysis of human lives.

But is there an intrinsic value in sustainable migration, conceptualised in light of the holistic protection envisioned by the 2030 Agenda, which could alter the way EU migration governance has been taking place in the past?

Even though posing this question seems a bit out of topic in the times of COVID-19, please bear in mind that there is a significant number of people stranded in migration camps with no access to basic sanitation, or possibility of effective social distancing. Their stay in these camps is not a matter of choice, but rather of EU policies on the ground.

Emergency and short-term solutions

The 2015-2016 migration/refugee crisis indicated the inherent deficiencies of the EU migration framework in place. In an attempt to respond to a situation framed under an emergency discourse, the EU pursued exceptional measures to react to an immediate need, employing instruments outside the toolkit of EU law.

Central in this was the EU-Turkey Agreement, which is to be seen in line with already existing soft law agreements with third countries. Such instruments, albeit outside the scope of EU law, were already seen as central to the EU’s Global Approach on Migration. That is an approach to migration, which instead of focusing on regulation of entry and stay of incoming individuals, is rather addressing the reduction of root causes of migration and outsourcing EU border control to third countries. In the years that followed, the emergency rhetoric was used to reinforce, or even regularise an alteration in the balancing of human rights in the context of mobility in relation to security considerations

Nevertheless, the EU policy on the ground seemed to have succeeded in reducing and stabilising the arrivals of new populations. Hence, instead of examining what instruments would be adopted so that the EU is better able to handle situations of mass influx in the future, the political agenda post 2015 was focused on reinforcing mechanisms of exclusion. Namely third country partnerships, surveillance mechanisms and search and rescue operation effected in ways that there is no physical control of EU authorities on people found in distress at sea.

Is emergency the new normal?

The stabilised context of EU migration governance seemed to have been altered in February 2020. In mid-February 2020, the Greek Government, in an attempt of better implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement, announced its plan to expropriate privately owned lands in specific Greek islands in order to build closed spaces of containment for migrants and refugees of bigger capacity compared to the existing hotspots. The announcement was met with discontent by the local populations, which in turn was addressed with police suppression.

The situation was escalating on parallel on the other side of the Aegean. Following fatalities suffered by Turkey due to an attack by Syrian forces in Ildib, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced his inability to further guard the EU-Turkey borders. This led to the beginning of a new flow of refugees and migrants from mainland Turkey to Greece. Erdoğan used these refugees and migrants as a bargaining chip to renegotiate the terms of his agreement with the EU.

In response, the Greek Government increased military presence at the land borders and declared that no illegal entry would be allowed. Simultaneously, in the Greek islands, citizens undertook the role of vigilantes, denying boarding to refugee dinghies rescued at sea by the Greek coastguard, blocking hotspots so that newly arrived migrants and refugees cannot enter and randomly attacking NGO workers, journalists and anyone who was not Greek.

Further to that, Greece proceeded in the adoption of a legal act, whereby the possibility of submission of applications for asylum was suspended for one month effective from March 1st 2020. This measure, which is in derogation from international and European obligations, was initiated in the pretext of emergency threatening the security of the Greek State.

The EU response to the situation on the ground was formed around an Action Plan which emphasised  securing border controls in the affected areas instead of managing migration movement in a fair and responsible manner.

What is the way forward?

These events serve to point out that governance through partnerships of contested legal nature is always dependent on the will of both parties. However, when such third countries are found in a context of destabilised national and international setting, there is no way to ensure that the partnerships can remain functional in the long term.

Awaiting an EU pact on asylum and migration the following might be said. The crisis and emergency narrative prevalent in EU institutional discourse in the years following 2015 has been accompanied by countervailing claims of sustainability. While it seems that sustainability in this context is understood as a long-term plan aimed at holistically addressing migration governance, the question remains: how do we envision sustainable migration?

In light of the holistic approach of the 2030 Agenda, sustainable migration should be understood and framed in light of maximal protection of human life. It should be centred around migrants as humans and not as flows, whereas it should also ensure that there are sufficient legal channels available for people on the move to reach their end destination in a safe and dignified manner. Instead of deflecting responsibility and furthering exclusion, EU migration policy should be inclusive and respectful of all humans, regardless of their legal status.

April 9, 2020

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Poverty, Pestilence and Pandemic

Pastoralists in Kenya with goates. Photo.
Pastoralists in Kenya. Source: unknown

The implications of COVID-19 on pastoralist livelihoods in Kenya’s drylands.

Posted on 3 April 2020 by Billy Jones

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.

Let me ask you a question. And I want you to be honest. How much has the coronavirus pandemic really affected your life so far? Has it forced you to work from home? Cancel a few meetings? Maybe delay your fieldwork? If, like me, the answer to all these questions is yes then you are probably extremely privileged.

If you are lucky enough to still have a job and have not lost any loved ones then, in all honesty, the impact of coronavirus on your day-to-day life is probably not that bad. Worrying, sure. Inconvenient, definitely. But far from devastating.

Now, I’m not just saying this to make you feel bad. I’m merely hoping to offer a dose of perspective, to make you realise how lucky you are. Because for some people – in fact, the vast majority of the global poor – coronavirus genuinely is ruining lives.

Let’s take a look at an example.

The rugged drylands of Kenya are home to some 10 million pastoralists whose livelihoods depend on raising livestock and selling the produce at market. In a country of extreme income inequality, 35% of the population live on less than $1.90 a day and livestock produce is fundamental to income and food security.

Already on the Back Foot

Unsurprisingly, climate change is a real threat in the region, making life more precarious and income security harder to come by. Last year was no exception.

In a region that relies on two rainy seasons a year to produce enough vegetation to feed the 65 million cows, sheep and goats that keep pastoral economies afloat, it is paramount that the rains don’t fail.

Which they did last year. Both of them.

These back-to-back droughts were followed by extreme flooding which severely affected 3.4 million livelihoods in the region, washing away entire villages and drowning the grasslands that feed the livestock.

Source: OCHA

And, as if that wasn’t enough, the floods were followed by a plague of locusts which has ravaged the entire region. The swarm which is making its way across East Africa eating as much food as 35,000 people every single day risks pushing 3 million people into food insecurity.

To put it mildly, climate change has made life tough for Kenya’s pastoralists over the past year.

And now they have coronavirus to deal with.

Interventions and Livelihoods

Like most others, the Kenyan government have been urging people to practice social distancing, self-isolate and work from home when possible.

But, what exactly does this mean for pastoralists? They typically sell their livestock at bustling, crowded markets and abattoirs, or sell milk to local restaurants and schools. Working from home is certainly not an option. Social distancing at a busy market is nigh-on impossible. And self-isolating means you cannot go to market and sell your livestock for much needed cash.

Kenyan politicians selecting goats to purchase at Kimalel Goat Auction. Pastoralists rely on markets like this to sell their livestock and gain a secure income. Source: Daily Active

On top of this the government are taking serious actions to prevent the spread of the disease such as nationwide curfews, banning public gatherings and closing schools, universities and bars and restaurants. While the benefits of this approach ought to be recognised, it will also have a serious economic impact on pastoralists. For example, with 86% of Kenya’s dairy being sold informally at local schools, kiosks and restaurants, these actions threaten to cut off an extremely important source of daily income for many pastoralists. In typically patriarchal societies, this has a bigger impact on women. Milking is typically a female domain and this daily income is often the only income they have control over, meaning even more income insecurity for women.

Moral Dilemma

This puts pastoralists in an extremely difficult situation. Do they follow the rules, thereby foregoing the desperately needed income they have lost in the past year of climatic disasters? Or do they carry on as normal and risk spreading the virus among their community and throughout the national market networks?

The economic shockwaves of coronavirus are undoubtedly going to devastate the livelihoods of countless pastoralists who are already faced with unfathomable climate challenges to say the least. And sadly, this sobering set of circumstances is far too similar for poor communities the world over.

Time will only tell the impact this pandemic has on the livelihoods of those most at risk. Hopefully the world’s leaders will step up and offer those who most need it the support to ride the shockwaves.

In the meantime, I hope this gives you a bit of perspective on your own situation. Perhaps working from home isn’t so bad after all.

April 3, 2020

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The wisdom of the fool

Wood sign and track in forest. Photo.
Photo: private

Posted on 19 March 2020 by Juan Ocampo

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.

It has been sometime since my last post, but things have been busy around here. The reason for my delay is that for the last couple of months I have been trying to make sense of what collaboration and interdisciplinarity could mean. I think that in order to tackle complex problems we need to broader our perspectives, so in this quest for interdisciplinarity I got myself looking into different departments and institutes around Lund. One of the result of this search was a workshop with Sakiko Fukuda-Parr who was presenting her work:  “Knowledge and Politics in setting and measuring the SDGs”.

It seemed like a good opportunity to reflect on some of the questions I started this blog series with: Paradigms and Governance mechanisms. To prepare for Sakiko’s workshop, I had a look into some of her articles and got myself reflecting on the “politics” of measuring. In the article “Keeping Out Extreme Inequality from the SDG Agenda – The Politics of Indicators”, Sakiko describes the discussions that were held when defining the targets for the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) related to Inequality (aka SDG 10). My interpretation of Sakiko’s example goes as follow: When defining development goals, politics and ruling paradigms are interweaved in the why and how of what we measure, sometimes even leaving the technical rigour aside.

Unsettled by this finding, I started studying the story of other development goals, and let me tell you that these tensions are present in many SDGs. Another example of these ideological tensions in the SDGs can be found in in the construction of SDG 8, specifically in regard to what economic growth is. In their book “Transforming multilateral diplomacy: the inside story of the sustainable development goals,” Chasek, Kamau, and O’Connor write that developing countries had economic growth as one of their priorities, while other countries “viewed unconstrained economic growth in potential conflict with sustainability (…) such a goal should highlight economic benefits of greener development (…) and avoid environmentally unsound technologies” (Ibid, pg . 178). However, if you analyse SDG 8, the green environmental perspective is not the main point in the goal’s targets and indicators. Coming from Colombia, I can understand the need for economic growth but most developed economies are moving towards greener development, and not embedding a green economic growth in our policies will once again leave developing countries dragging behind.

Not being an Economist limits my discussion about how to measure inequality or economic growth. However, the “wisdom of the fool” allows me to question, for example, why inequality is measured based on income, rather than access to quality education, for example. I believe that having some dollars in a bank account could ease the life of many, but does not necessarily eliminate the problem of classes that inequality entitles. This discussion is about the paradigms we accept and the realities we want to create.

The SDGs are built on paradigms that reinforce certain realities while eliminating others. Advocating for the SDGs without a thoughtful analysis of the assumptions and paradigms that are reinforced in these goals, is inconvenient, almost irresponsible, since financial investments, public policies, research initiatives, and people’s actions are being guided by the SDG agenda. This is problematic, and not only because you could agree (or not) with some of the paradigms, but because we are probably not aiming at the causes of the problems, we are not transforming what needs to be transformed. Sometimes we spend more time watching the signboards, rather than exploring the forest.

We could argue that the SDG agenda is a way in which ruling organisations (e.g. UN, World Bank) are aiming for a different world. However, others could argue that whoever sets the agenda are the ones in power so the 2030 Agenda is just a mode in which certain institutions maintain their domination over society. It is up to you to judge, but “institutions not only depend upon the activities of individuals but also constrain and mould them, this positive feedback gives institutions even stronger self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating characteristics”[1]. So, today I invite you to question the paradigms that we sometimes accept without reflecting; allow yourself to be the fool in the room, and remember that it is in times of crisis we have the opportunity to reinvent our society. To do so, we have to identify our paradigms and reflect on the values we want to embrace.

Finally, I want to tell you about my second attempt for interdisciplinarity and collaboration, a podcast. Advancing Sustainable Solutions Podcast  is a show hosted by Sofie and Steven, two colleagues at the International Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics (IIIEE) here at Lund. For two seasons they have been discussing trends in sustainability solutions and in their latest episode I have been talking about Digital Financial Inclusion, so have a look and let me know your thoughts!

Juan Ocampo is a PhD candidate within the Agenda 2030 Graduate School at Lund University School of Economics and Management.


[1] Hodgson, 2004: 656 cited by Gómez, G. (2019). Monetary plurality in local, regional and global economies. London: Routledge

March 19, 2020

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Sustainable Transportation and Micromobility

E-scooters parked in stand. Photo.
Image by Christian Bueltemann from Pixabay

Posted on 10 March 2020 by Phil Justice Flores

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.

How do I get from my apartment to work? Which mode of transport should I take to meet my friends for dinner next week? These questions are something that we deal with regularly, yet, one requires more time for consideration than the other. Most likely, we do not deliberate much about the first question because it has become a part of our daily routine. With the second question, however, we are in a circumstance that somehow needs more thought. We have to consider things such as the distance and accessibility of the place where we will meet our friends, the time it takes to get there, the availability of parking spaces or public transportation at the location. But for both questions, many of us might fail to consider what the consequences of our transport choice is to the environment, or perhaps, we don’t and just ignore it?

Transport and Agenda 2030 Goal 11

The transport industry is responsible for 27 per cent of greenhouse emission in the European Union. In order to meet the target of “Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable” of the Agenda 2030 Goal 11 of Sustainable Cities and Communities, policy-makers and transport companies need to come up with concrete ideas to reduce the negative environmental impact from the transport sector. The United Nations define sustainable transport as “the provision of services and infrastructure for the mobility of people and goods advancing economic and social development to benefit today’s and future generations in a manner that is safe, affordable, accessible, efficient, and resilient, while minimizing carbon and other emissions and environmental impacts”.

Technological advancements have introduced potential solutions to help cities and communities increase sustainability in the transport industry without the need for huge changes in the built environment. One of the potential solutions generated through these developments is micromobility. Considered an answer to the first-and-last-mile problem, micromobility is a shared transport mode that uses electric or human-powered smaller scale, light-weight vehicles, such as bikes, e-bikes, e-scooters, and mopeds, on an as-needed basis. Sharing is usually through mobile applications.

Micromobility

Micromobility is designed as an alternative to conventional forms of transport. Five distinguishing features are essential to micromobility. First, it is a shared mode of transport. Second, it is designed for use of only one passenger per trip. Third, it can be used anywhere in a determined location without any specified routes. Fourth, most of the vehicles can be accessed through the use of smartphones and apps. Finally, users are able to use the vehicles anytime.

Several distinctions can also be used to differentiate between the microvehicles. Micromobility can include dockless and docked systems, and human-powered and electric-powered vehicles. Dockless system does not need any station for pick-up and parking of vehicles. Vehicles under this type can be left in public locations or any specified spaces, depending on the city legislation. Docked system, on the other hand, requires stations for getting and dropping-off of vehicles.

Whereas human-powered microvehicles need passenger effort to push the vehicles forward, electric-powered microvehicles make use of an installed battery to assist users in driving their vehicles during the trip.

Motivations for (Non-)Adoption of Micromobility

Why do people use these shared microvehicles? Several approaches to examine motivation for use of micromobility can be applied. A simple way of putting motivations into perspective is by asking some of these questions:

  1. Is it cheaper and more convenient to use micromobility than taking the car?
  2. Is the use of micromobility exciting and fun?
  3. Does the use of micromobility signal that I adopt innovations faster than my peers do?

The first question pertains to the functional benefits of using micromobility. Some users may take shared dockless e-bikes because they think it is cheaper than having one’s own e-bike. The second one refers to the possible feelings choosing micromobility induces, or the hedonic benefits of using the mobility option, such as excitement and fun. The last one shows the symbolic aspect of adoption. There are many possible reasons why users adopt the shared mode of transport, but these reasons could also act as barriers for people who refuse to adopt micromobility. Bearing these questions in mind, it is hard to say whether users and non-users see the environmental benefits of these vehicles.

What are your thoughts?

Going back to the questions I posed at the beginning, given the potential benefits and drawbacks of micromobility, would you consider taking a shared e-bike the next time you go to work because there is a docking station close by? Do you think it is possible to reach the meeting place with your friends though an e-scooter because there are no buses that go there? Lastly, do you consider these shared microvehicels part of a sustainable transport system? Let me know what you think!

March 10, 2020

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Systemic power imbalances in responsible investments

Piles of coins with bigget pile in glass jar, all includes a plant. Photo.
Image by Nattanan Kanchanaprat at Pixabay

Posted on 19 February 2020 by Soo-hyun Lee

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.

This article has been published with the Asian Development Bank Institute’s Asia Pathways.

The recent surge of interest in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investments has brought with it closer scrutiny of the way in which ESG factors are evaluated as conditions before an investment can be categorized as such. Environmental factors have been receiving a lion’s share of the attention in these investments, which have been riding on the institutional clout lent unto them by green growth. Governance factors, while not as much of a predominant issue for portfolio investments given their necessary acceptance of the domestic regulatory regime in which the investment is being made, also come with substantial institutional and academic presence, particularly due to the inclusion of rule of law in democratic peacebuilding. International financial institutions have also debuted enormous data-driven projects on governance factors, upon which they base their financing and risk decisions. Of these, social factors have by far been receiving the least (and most narrow) attention, largely due to the less obvious role that the private sector can assume outside of corporate social responsibility.

Private equity firms and financial institutions have been pouring considerable resources into boosting the coherence and profitability of ESG investments. However, rather than viewing E, S, and G as isolated variables, a co-beneficial approach is necessary in order to avoid the same problems that the progenitors of the World Bank governance indicators encountered. That is, an environmental factor viewed in isolation may have negative repercussions for the S or G factors. Systemic power imbalances, however, make this difficult to achieve.

Power relations is a common theme in the scholarship of environmental justice and degrowth.  For instance, Akbulut et al. (2019) features a call for a “politico-metabolic reconfiguration” that views the use of ecosystem resources, the socioeconomic units that use them, and the institutions that govern both as constituting a single metabolic system. ESG, from this purview, offers enlightening options for reflection. Ecological and socioeconomic systems are seen as sharing a “continuous throughput of energy and materials in order to maintain their internal structure” over which “politico-institutional structure[s]” govern them in order to “reach higher levels of ecological sustainability” if seeking to achieve environmental justice. Viewing these ecological and socioeconomic systems separately means that their shared “throughput of energy and materials” shall no longer be aligned, tilting it off a sustainable balance. In understanding this balance, while a central consideration is the “power relations that shape metabolisms, i.e. the political economy”, there are other equally systemic imbalances that hinder the achievement of that sustainable balance that very much exist in responsible investment systems like ESG.

Bringing the social element of ESG under the lens of this discussion raises the challenges of how power relations affect the way that so-called socially responsible investments are screened or assessed across this scale of power relations. For instance, if the enactment of an environmental policy results in a more vulnerable social class shouldering a greater burden of the change, this moves only to deepen double injustices. The imbalance present in ESG to the E and G factors also provides a forum to reflect on this power imbalance challenge raised by the politico-metabolic configuration in an innovative way. That is, the imbalance between the power lent to environmental and governance factors in a nascent yet solidifying system of finance would, if left unaddressed, continue to subdue social concerns to the relative merits (accessibility) of environmental and governance factors. Within that scenario and in the operating principle of profit maximization, the potential social consequences of an ESG investment (or, perhaps, an E and/or G investment), may be considered to be acceptable collateral in the arithmetic of net value.

If one were to step back and view this challenge more metaphysically, then the entire undertaking of ESG investments and the reliance on indices can be ontologically problematic. Screening investments under a quantification of potentially competitive indices (such as socially responsible investment with lesser concern for the environment), can perpetuate the imbalance in power relations discussed in the metabolic purview. An investment that may be evaluated as partially sustainable or responsible due to its inclusion of environmental factors, as a less-contested regime, may promote unsettling social harm. As Martinez-Alier et al. (2012) identify with attempts to green gross domestic product, the extent to which various factors are included or excluded in these indices “reflect the social and political strength of different interests and social values” (Martinez-Alier, et al., 63). This challenge becomes especially reverberant when attempting to standardize those systems of indices across countries with highly disparate levels of development. If environmental factors are seen as the most accessible (in terms of quantification, for instance), then sustainable investment may harness investor confidence in environmental investments alone—even if those projects may very well exacerbate the power imbalances ingrained in social values, such as gender empowerment.

How are these power imbalances being addressed in ESG investments? One way has been by applying key performance indicators (KPI) that are different from entry condition requirements. For instance, according to the recommendations by the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) under its thematic investment category of water, companies that qualify for impact investments need to “generate at least 70% of their direct revenues from water products, services technologies or products” (or 100% for suppliers of crucial components or services) as well as satisfy the thematic conditions shown in Table 1.

Table 1: PRI Thematic Conditions for Water

Source: Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI). 2018. Impact Investing Market Map, pp. 56–57.

Simultaneously, common KPI used for thematic investments in water include such measurements as the number of unique women, unique poor individuals, and unique low income-individuals “who were clients of the organisation during the reporting period” (PRI 2018: 56–57). In reflecting on this approach, it becomes clear that embracing a metabolic approach to ESG investments depends on the rigour of the conditions imposed as well as the weight and design of the KPI. While investment in water and its impact within Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6 are relatively easy to compute, this exercise becomes harder when working with topics such as SDG 5 (Gender Equality) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities). This is perhaps also reflected in the distribution of the representative thematic investments identified by the PRI.

Figure 1: Distribution of Thematic Investments Classifications by SDG

Source: Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI). 2018. Impact Investing Market Map, p. 99.

As responsible investment continues to grow, viewing the impact within the system of a continuous throughput shall without a doubt be a helpful exercise in addressing questions of power relations between stakeholders and stakeholding interests.


The views expressed in this publication are those of the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of any institution. 

February 19, 2020

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UNDP Gender Strategy and Kenya’s Floods

Man walking with sack on back between rows of sacks. Photo.
Image: AU UN IST Photo / Tobin Jones, AMISOM Public Information

Posted on 6 February 2020 by Billy Jones

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.

UNDP’s Gender Strategy 2018-2021 endeavours to weave an emphasis on gender into the interventions and work it carries out, particularly in eradicating poverty and crisis management. Crisis response is a crucial arena in which the UN gender strategy is intended to be implemented.

Crises typically exacerbate pre-existing structural inequalities and have the potential to make the most marginalised members of a community worse-off.

Less access to decision-making arenas, a higher burden of care and less rights to land and resources typically produce a multiplier effect of the impact of crises on women as compared with men, especially in the Global South.

Flooding in West Pokot, Kenya

October-December 2019 saw one of the most severe floods in East Africa’s recent history with rainfall as high as 400% of the average. Abnormally warm water in the Indian Ocean created more rain that was carried inland. Three million people have been adversely affected by the flooding and at least 250 people have died.

In Kenya more than 130 people have died across the country. One of the worst affected areas is West Pokot which is home to many agro-pastoralist communities. In one weekend in December, over 60 people died in a landslide that brought mud down from the highlands, wiping out three villages.

What’s more, the region is very remote with poor infrastructure. Many of the road bridges have been swept away, making it extremely difficult to get emergency food, medical supplies and blankets to the remote, highland villages.

Gendered Disaster Relief?

Disaster relief efforts are on-going in the area through collaborative efforts by UN, Red Cross, the Kenyan Government and a number of other NGOs, spearheaded by the UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The UN being at the helm means the operation ought to adopt a gender strategy.

Often it is the people who cannot access the emergency relief who need it the most. Distribution plans needs to take into account the social dynamics of the local context. They need to be aware of the different groups in a community and how they interact. Otherwise, they run the risk of distributing supplies to those that can access them rather than those most in need.

So, has this been the case? Has the relief effort prioritised the most vulnerable members of the West Pokot community?

In a crisis such as East Africa’s current floods careful, strategic planning is notoriously difficult to carry out – organisations need to just get out there and save lives, surely they don’t have time to worry about who they should prioritise and how they are exacerbating structural inequalities?

Hopefully this is not the response we hear from OCHA and their partners! A quick look at the situation suggests that a gender strategy is most definitely necessary – and doable – in West Pokot.

Men Giving to Men

The screenshot above shows emergency food rations being given out on the side of the road. Because the roads leading up to the affected villages were impassable, the food was given out on the road as close as the lorries could reach. What is striking here is that there are only men queuing up for food, no women.

But why are there only men here and what does this imply for the distribution of food?

It is likely that these men reached the relief via motorbike – a common form of transport in the area. Women don’t tend to ride motorbikes so they wouldn’t be able to reach the road as easily. What’s more, the women are more likely to be assigned the responsibility of caring for the children and elderly so they could not leave to collect the rations as easily. This is a strong indicator that access is dependent on gender. So, how food is later distributed within a household is also likely to be gendered.

The coordinated relief and distribution plans ought to be aware of this. It is essential that a gender strategy is identified as a need early in the planning stages of relief distribution. Having their eyes open to such gender dynamics from the off will help the relief agencies react appropriately. This will put them in a better position to channel support to those who truly need it most.

February 6, 2020

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The tricky issue of sustainability and human wellbeing

Billboard signs of global goals on skyscrapers. Photo.
UN Photo: Manuel Elias

Posted on 7 January 2020 by Tanya Andersson Nystedt

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.

Sustainability is a concept central to the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  It is defined as “Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. This definition covers two concepts – 1) that of need, which implies minimum levels as well as 2) limitations, which implies maximum levels. To date, most of the work on the SDGs have focused almost exclusively on the meeting of minimum requirements and needs and almost not at all on any upper limits, except when dealing with ecological concerns, and then to a very limited extent, in the form of emission caps or the phasing out of fossil fuels, for example.

So far, the mainstream discourse imagines that human development will be able to limit ecological damage without addressing the broader social and economic structures; that infinite economic growth is possible in a world with finite resources. This has been called “sustainable development” or “green growth” in which it is imagined the increase in material and energy use that has accompanied GDP growth can somehow be decoupled through increases in efficiency and effectiveness of production processes and a transition to renewable energy sources. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to support this optimism. Research shows that while so-called green growth may bring gains in efficiency and effectiveness, these benefits are negated by increases in production and consumption. As a result, improvements in  efficiency and effectiveness actually increase resource and energy use. This is called the rebound effect. In fact, no country has achieved sustained decoupling of GDP growth from increased ecological footprints. It would seem that the continued global focus on GDP growth as a goal is inconsistent with saving our planet from catastrophic climate change.

What does this mean for human wellbeing?

That GDP is a problematic indicator to measure wellbeing is well known. However, it is widely accepted as the means to achieving improvements in human wellbeing and funding welfare, including adequate housing, water and sanitation, education, employment, health and welfare services. GDP is also central to the SDGs, even having its own goal (Goal 8) and contributing to all the others. What happens to human wellbeing without the conception of everlasting GDP growth? Most of the focus in the traditional development discourse has been about raising the levels of the poorest and most vulnerable – of meeting minimum criteria for human survival and wellbeing – of “leaving no one behind”. In a world with infinite GDP growth, improving the lives of the poorest has not required a trade-off; more for some has not meant that there is less for everyone else. Instead of having to “divide the pie,” we conceived of an ever-growing pie.

But this conception does not seem to reflect the reality in which we live. As such the “fairytales of eternal economic growth” as described by Greta Thunberg seem to be exactly that: a fairytale. In a world of limited resources, sustainability requires that we look beyond provision of minimum levels of those worst off to also address maximum levels of those best off. In order to ensure adequate resources to meet both the needs of current and future generations we do require a trade-off, and this trade-off implies redistribution – from the rich to the poor, from the global North to the global South, from the haves to the have nots. There is no country today that meets the welfare needs of its populations while living within the earth’s planetary boundaries  and this is clearly not sustainable, however we choose to look at it.

This reality, this approach to sustainability which takes into account absolute planetary limits, is not reflected in the very technical approach to sustainability and climate change being pursued at the moment. And even this depoliticised, technocratic approach seems to be more than the current global order can handle (for example, the outcome of the COP 25 in Madrid), despite the imminent existential threat of catastrophic climate change. Is the economic and social transformation required by this conception of sustainability even possible under the current social and economic power structures? And if not, are our current aspirations “good enough”? 

January 7, 2020

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In search of the “unexpected” – designing our financial freedom

Posted on 17  December 2019 by Juan Ocampo

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.

In this post, I want to share some of the insights from my last couple of weeks doing fieldwork in Kenya. This journey started while looking for unexpected ideas. In one of the labyrinths that are Lund libraries, there was a book that caught my eye: “Designing Freedom” by Stafford Beer, the father of Management Cybernetics. Even though written in the 1970s, Beer´s idea of how institutions invest more resources to keep their status quo rather than in creating solutions for the problems that societies have troubled my mind. This concept got me reflecting on the financial inclusion discussion we have had through the last posts: if money is the way to empower people, why is this agenda being set by actors that are not necessarily representative or even know the people for whom they are setting the agenda? Is this just a way in which powerful actors are (re)producing themselves instead of focusing in people’s needs? It was with these ideas in mind that I caught my flight to Nairobi.

Fulfilling my role as a researcher (or trying at least), I found myself following and questioning people through rivers and mountains of Kenya. To my surprise, I encountered a new perspective to the institutional ideas that I was still wrestling with. In the most vulnerable regions of the Kenya, communities are designing their own financial freedom. Through trust, respect, and communing, financial inclusion was being achieved.

In Kenya, communities have been developing (or adapting) different kinds of practices that work as financial inclusion mechanisms. Here I will mention two of them but please be in touch in the comment section if you would like to hear more. The first one is called merry-go-round. In this financial mechanism, people meet every week, collect some fixed amount of money as a group and each week one member gets the pot as a gift, no need for paying back. The second financial mechanism, is called table banking. In these groups, (usually) women gather to save money, put together emergency funds, and offer loans to the group members. It is quite amazing how these grassroot initiatives are transforming social structures and developing innovations in local communities. These are real grassroot financial inclusion mechanisms. No need for high interest rates, contracts, or collaterals, just shared values and community trust.

Paraphrasing Ester Barinaga, whom I had the opportunity to travel with: There are no perfect solutions, just a group of good solutions working for a better purpose. As useful as these table banking groups are for local communities, they are not flawless and one of the key problems is that not every member has a stable income. As a consequence, there is a problem of access, but not to bank accounts or high interest loans, but to money. And this is where Complementary Currencies as grassroot financial innovations are disrupting the “Game”. Communities are using cryptocurrencies to trade inside and amongst their groups. Yes, they are using the blockchain, but more on this next year.

If you are interested in Financial Inclusion, want to know more about Complementary Currencies or just find these topics interesting don’t hesitate to comment or get in touch. It is always fun to talk about money 😉

Juan Ocampo is a PhD candidate within the Agenda 2030 Graduate School at LUSEM – Lund University

December 17, 2019

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Transparency in Investment Arbitration as Participatory Limitations

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WordPress Transparency Report (https://bit.ly/2KSB9fX)

Posted on 25 November 2019 by Soo-hyun Lee

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.

Private entities involved in investment treaty arbitration often elect to keep arbitral proceedings and specific details of an arbitral award confidential in cases when they deem corporate and/or propriety information a risk to publish. The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the most commonly employed forum for ISDS, in 32(2) of its Arbitration Rules of April 2006 requires the tribunal overseeing the dispute to sufficient measures in protecting the confidentiality of propriety or privileged information. This is reiterated in Article 13(2) of the Additional facility of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, which casts a broader net in terms of the information that the proceedings and decision must prevent unwarranted disclosure. In addition to the ICSID, the United Nation Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in Article 25(4) and 32(5) of its Arbitration Rules (1976) also requires that ISDS hearings are held in private unless both parties consent to open them to the public. This work first reflects on the normative implications of the confidentiality requirement and then how those requirements and implications raise ethical considerations in international investment law research.

On a normative level, this has been controversial due to the fact that investment treaty arbitration often deals with matters that fall under the remit of the public interest. Not permitting public access raises questions of transparency and accountability, not only on the competencies of the tribunal but also that of the government. While this is more pronounced for the State as the respondent party to the dispute, it also applies for the private sector entity as a contributing unit to community welfare surplus. As per the former, whether the State behaved in a manner that is deemed violative to its treaty obligations with the home country of the investor, the arbitral award that it must furnish shall inevitably constitute public expenditure. Arbitral awards arising from investor-State disputes (ISDS) can easily run up into billions of USD in compensation and legal costs, making the issue a politically sensitive one particularly in States with strained current accounts.

On the basis of these concerns, there have been movements to increase the transparency of arbitral proceedings and awards. Currently, such public disclosures require the mutual consent of the disputing parties, as a unilateral disclosure of information could result in reputational or material damages for the opposing party, thereby putting these movements on conflicting paths. This became an especially poignant issue in Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID ARB/05/22, 2006). The disputing parties did not have an agreement concerning public disclosure, putting the task of whether a unilateral disclosure of information by Tanzania would constitute a violative act. When the case was ongoing, there was both immense national media coverage on Biwater v Tanzania as well as calls for the proceedings to be publically available. Tanzania argued that it should be permitted to make the proceedings accessible, arguing this was in line with larger movements to improve transparency in ISDS. Biwater Gauff contested these claims, emphasizing the consensual nature of permitting the publication of propriety or privileged information. The Tribunal ultimately differentiated between the types of documents that could be disclosed, as well as the timing of their disclosure, based on the extent to which those documents are considered sensitive and the fact that a decision of this kind had to be made in case-by-case manner.

The Biwater v Tanzania dispute also brings up matters of ethical interest to international investment law research. First of all, asymmetries in the availability of materials in international investment law necessarily have disproportionate impacts on legal research. Having access to confidential documents may boost the profile of research outputs given its insider nature, but inevitably has longer lasting implications, such as inability to check the falsification of the primary materials or subjecting the interpretation of those materials to an incontrovertibly opinionated rendition. Legal research, like that of any other discipline, is built on a tradition of academic integrity upheld by peer review and institutionalized through academic journals or law reviews. Selective disclosure of key materials in conducting research in international investment law can threaten those processes. An intention or unintentional omission of certain information can be influential enough to affect the entirety of the research and its conclusions. The inability to render these materials to a standard of acceptable academic integrity makes it difficult to deem whether the research is trustworthy at risk of such falsification or even the manipulation of research, whether intentionally or unintentionally.

Unfortunately, this is not as uncommon as one may hope to believe. Researchers in ISDS face considerable obstacles in their ability to access primary sources. They are either reserved for the legal counsel of the corporations or governments involved. There are very few (with very large market shares) sources that have access to these materials and while they do not disclose those materials in their entirety, they provide summaries of those materials – at exceptionally high subscription fees. These resources are relied upon by institutions like the United Nations in circumstances when States are unwilling (or unable) to publish such materials. Those who are able to climb over the rather exclusive paywall then unwittingly grapple with issues of objectivity in the materials made available to them.

The issue of transparency and confidentiality in investment treaty arbitration has been and continues to be a deeply divisive matter. While the long-run benefits of enhanced transparency present clear benefits, the lack of motivation and incentive obstruct meaningful progress. Returning to the normative concerns of public interest, one clear illustration of the need for transparency has been very much apparent in South Korea. The country faces the loss of a USD 4.7bn ISDS case with a clear connection to the public interest and that involved many millions more paid to top shelf law firms all on a bill passed to the taxpayer. Despite vociferous public outcry, the proceedings and decision remain confidential and shall most likely remain to do so. The implications of such confidentiality on the quality of legal research also falls into the domain of the public interest, though its contemplation as such as less present in discussions on reform such as those currently underway at the UNCITRAL Working Groups. Another discussion becomes how these issues influence more vulnerable States and their capacities to channel foreign investment to achieve public interest objectives such as sustainable development.


The views expressed in this publication are those of the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of any institution. 

November 25, 2019

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The Need for Policy Integration in Responsible Investment and Environmental Justice

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Posted on 21 November 2019 by Soo-hyun Lee

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.

Policies meant to push welfare gains to the public interest through, for instance, serving environmental justice, can face countervailing circumstances that may result in welfare losses that discount the value of the policy itself. Development economics points to a wide array of causal factors behind this, such as information asymmetries. Gough amongst others reflect on this complexity in sustainable development policy making, which the author humbly imposes meaningful interlinkages with select analytical approaches in international law and development economics.

First, what are these countervailing circumstances and how might they discount the welfare gains of environmental justice policy? Gough (2011) identifies numerous technical limitations, such as the rebound effect and unaccounted emissions contributions arising from offshore production in domestic emissions stocktaking. A more philosophical and normative circumstance is a perceived inefficiency and inequity of public policy when viewed from a cross sectoral approach between addressing both the concerns of climate change and those of social justice. One attempt to address this concern has been green growth, which was an attempt to decouple negative externalities, such as a worsening state of environmental justice, from economic growth. The problem with this view is that it does not promote a “strong” sustainability, which must be based on a sense of mutuality, collective interest and the common good. To strengthen the sustainability of policy, integration between these different spheres of justice is necessary to create a steady-state equilibrium of environmental and social welfare, amongst other, concerns.

The consequence of a lacking steady-state and policy integration can be, inter alia, a double injustice. Gouge (2013) flags, for instance, the particular sensitivity to the impacts of both climate change and the costs of its mitigation to entities (both countries and individuals) at higher risk. This includes States at higher risk to the effects of climate change such as desertification and rising sea levels, as well as due to the lack of economic resilience and disparities at the household, firm and macroeconomic levels. As climate and environmental risk factors deepen, “green poverty” also poses greater magnitudes of threats, thus calling for a “co-benefit” approach that attempts to shape a win-win approach to environmental and socioeconomic policy.

In addition to comparisons drawn between the co-benefit and upstream approaches to sustainable development policy, there is significant value added in a horizontal and cross-sectoral endeavour. In international economic governance, for instance, the grounds for such projects are increasingly fertile. Concepts, concerns and standards related to sustainable development are becoming inseparable to those in international economic law, financial markets and corporate governance. Over the past three to four years, the penultimate of these has been attracting particularly reverberant attention with the growth of environmental, social and governance (ESG) investments and other “green” standards for financial instruments, such as green bonds.

In many ways, the maturation and wide use of these standards within the private sector has been pushing forward a close union between sustainable development, insofar is captured by the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and financial markets. Yet this union and the expedited nature of its implementation has also been the subject of poignant controversy. For instance, from the latter half of 2019, portfolio investments in funds that value in the magnitude of billions of USD have been enjoying the benefits of the ESG label only to later be revealed to have included investments in firearms manufacturers and deep water drilling for hydrocarbon resources. Needless to say, this sparked existential self-reflection for ESG portfolios and hit a nerve for investors seeking financial gains with moral equanimity.

At its core, the contention behind the ESG debate was its lack of substantive definition and consequently procedural understanding to prevent “greenwashing”. There have since been subsequent calls for policy intervention to create threshold standards on what should qualify as an ESG investment, especially as the private sector has been increasingly showing an inability to do so. Meanwhile the World Bank has been fashioning quantitative measurements on the extent to which an ESG investment can be considered as such. The author argues here that this is a clear illustration of the need for a policy integration approach.

ESG investments are clearly an embodiment of the green growth mentality and its remarkable lack of accountability was very generous in its contributions to the mounting momentum to rid of such a classification entirely. It also adds to the argument that perhaps attempting to categorically pair environmental justice with economic growth is dead upon arrival. However, the author argues that the extent to which ESG was able to mobilize financial resources from and for both multinational corporations like Apple (which raised EUR 2bn through green bond sales) and small- to medium-sized enterprises, which to some extent have dedicated their infrastructures to advancing, at least nominally, the SDGs. Rather than seeking to eliminate a partially working system entirely, it would be more impactful to attempt to refine its machinery.

The United Nations has been seeking to do this through the Principles on Responsible Investment (PRI), which seek to provide more well developed “screens” to test the type of investments that qualify for classification as a responsible investment. The PRI engages the private sector in order to help shape a steady-state policy integration understanding of investment through ESG incorporation. This involves “explicitly and systematically including ESG issues in investment analysis”, though it does not evade persistent challenges to harmonized standards concerning ESG, which shall undoubtedly face the insufferable problem of a lack of uniformity in country and economic contexts. Furthermore, these initiatives, which certainly attempt to integrate policy in economic growth and sustainable development, also fall prey to the challenges raised by the limitations of green growth. Both portfolio and foreign direct investment are attracted by the promise of returns to investments. Economies that lack sufficiently attractive assets to investors or have countervailing factors may very much be susceptible to widening disparity gaps having been excluded from the surge in ESG. For instance, a country with traditional governance structures with strict social practices determined irresponsible within the determinations of ESG but with exemplary environmental stewardship shall indubitably face difficulties in ESG classification.

Should one travel further down to the philosophical kernel of this argument, it comes down to the classic question of laissez-faire. A policy integration and co-benefit approach will face the challenge of rescuing a positive trend in financing the SDGs while not crowding out the private sector with over-burdensome regulatory involvement.


The views expressed in this publication are those of the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of any institution. 

November 21, 2019

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High-level collaborations – “we are working on it”

Image by Kevin Schneider from Pixabay

Posted on 15 November 2019 by Juan Ocampo

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.

Last week I attended the event: “Collaboration for sustainability – how to move forward?” hosted by the Sustainability Forum and the Sustainable Future Hub at Lund University. Since my last post I have been thinking about how to govern complex processes of financial inclusion, so I came to this event in hopes for the final “answer”. Spoiler, I didn’t find a final answer, but a very good one I must admit.

In my last week’s post I finished by pointing at three important discussions. Two of which I want to bring back today.  As part of my quest to understand the ruling paradigms and powers around financial inclusion and alternative monetary models I found myself immersed in Financial Markets. Here, I believe, is where the “BIG players” are taking the decisions that define our future through the investments they make. As you might know, monetary policy in many countries is influenced by how “Wall Street” acts (or reacts) to different policies or events. To make this a little more tangible, imagine how much influence organizations such as Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), which manages assets of around USD $159,215 billion (as of 2018) or Goldman Sachs, which managed around USD 933 Billion (as of 2018), could have if they decided to move relevant amount of their investments to companies that comply to high standards of sustainability. Some could question if they really have the power to influence policy making, and I will recommend you to watch the movie “Too Big To Fail” so you get an idea of how much power and influence Banks have.

Some of the most important actors in investment banking were in the Bloomberg Business Forum talking about climate change and sustainability. Even though I have been following these conversations just recently, for what I understand having this topic (i.e. sustainability) on the agenda is definitely an advance in getting sustainability in the “Game”.  There are many interesting takeaways of this forum, but I want to highlight one point of a panel in which Denis Duverne (AXA), David Solomon (Goldman Sachs), and Hiro Mizuno (GPIF) participated. Through their discussion, they reflected on the need for more transparent information about their asset’s environmental impacts. Solomon’s answer: “we are working on it…. but the answer is we are working on it”. However, he later suggested the need for a clearer government climate policy framework that sets the guidelines and standards for the data companies as well as disclosing their climate impact.

So, I want to come back again to my initial question and its relation to the event “Collaboration for sustainability – how to move forward?”.  As the title of the event hints, the discussion focused on collaboration and how to achieve this by including different stakeholders. The key speakers came from The International Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics (IIIEE), Sustainable Plastics and Transition Pathways and Venture Lab. Per Mickwitz from IIIEE gave an interesting perspective on how different agendas need to include small actors if they want to have relevant and impactful collaborations. It was a perfect moment to find the answer to my governance reflections, so I asked him: “How can we get citizens’ points of view in discussions where the interests of the big and smaller actors are not necessarily aligned? Well, he gave a good answer to quite a complex question. Transparency and communication. This might seem quite obvious, and that is why I brought the Bloomberg Business Forum to the discussion. How much transparency can actors (e.g Goldman Sachs) immersed in the current economic paradigm allow? What are the incentives for organizations that are locked in a system they created to transform into a more sustainable paradigm and allow small actors into the conversation? I still don’t have the answer but if like me you find these question relevant there is going to be an interesting workshop about “The capital market – a driving force in the transformation towards sustainable businesses?” hosted by the Sustainability Hub at LUSEM that I hope will bring some interesting perspectives.

Let’s wrap up. Governance of complex processes (e.g. monetary policy) includes many stakeholders, all of them with different and even conflicting interests. The incentives for some of the big players to “buy into” the sustainability paradigm are not very clear, and thus governments might need to develop adequate accountability frameworks to re-frame the current incentives. But then how can people that are not at this level of conversation get heard? It is not clear yet, but transparency and communication together might be a  way to go. Perhaps complementary currencies could be useful to explore this idea of transparency and communication. But can money have agency?  This is a relevant question to look at and believe me, I am working on it.

Inspired by these reflections, in my next post I will get a little bit more into the topic of financial inclusion and try to connect some of the thoughts I have been working on lately, specifically in regard to digital money and blockchain. By the way, if you find my posts interesting I have a personal blog in which I get a little more into complementary currencies from an organizational perspective and other topics I feel relevant to reflect on, so feel free to join the conversation there as well!

Juan Ocampo is a PhD candidate within  Agenda 2030 Graduate School at LUSEM – Lund University

November 15, 2019

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Legitimacy in Law, Economics and the 2030 Agenda

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Photo of a historical marker in Carroll, New Hampshire, about the Bretton Woods Monetary Conference of 1944 (taken 2007). Photo permission: https://bit.ly/33FxAku

Posted on 13 November 2019 by Soo-hyun Lee

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Agenda 2030 Graduate School or Lund University. The present document is being issued without formal editing.

Assessing whether a government measure or policy is legitimate in international economic law is largely contingent on inter alia the extent to which the measure or policy was able to exact its intended purpose and whether that purpose is determined to contribute to a matter of public interest. One significant factor in satisfying these conditions is good governance, which refers to government institutions as the progenitor of policy that seeks to maximize public goods. In that process, these institutions encounter a diverse range of public and private interests. Rothstein (2012) wrote that government institutions that are able to serve the “common good” as opposed to the interests of a select few at the expense of the whole is a central designation of good governance.

However, beyond this rather broad principle, attempts to codify a set of stylized assumptions on the common good have been profoundly unsuccessful. One such attempt was the Washington Consensus, which was built on the neoliberal assumption that economic growth would be the panacea for socioeconomic demands. The Washington Consensus aimed to maximize economic growth via “massive deregulation of markets, tightening of public spending, guarantees for property rights, and large-scale privatizations”. The failure of the Washington Consensus to deliver its projected outputs universally was in part due to the disparities in good governance. This meant that regardless of whether development policy may demonstrate a coherent internal logic, the absence of good governance in institutions would hamper the extent to which that policy can serve the common good.

Legitimacy provides a means to evaluate governance because it involves the sets of practices and norms that constitute the common good. Legitimate global governance would thus be a means to measure the extent to which governance institutions are responsive to the common good (or alternatively, the extent to which governance institutions need to be reformed). As Brasset and Tsingou (2012) show, the study of legitimacy becomes important in processes of transformation, like globalization, where fissures between private and public interests “spread across frontiers by market forces and by global trends”. One of the most pronounced demonstrations of this phenomenon is the environment and the irreversible changes that anthropogenic forces upon it. Legitimate governance must reflect changing and/or varying circumstances while keeping on course to advance the interests of the common good.

Returning to the Washington Consensus, one can then see that while it was an attempt to legitimize global economic governance under the rallying cry of neoliberalism, its operating principle was to converge diversities in economic, political and cultural modalities rather than acknowledge them. The Bretton Woods institutions that heralded this governance were charged with adapting initially noncompliant countries to a specific set of practices and norms that were given authority through their macroeconomic technicality. The success that industrialized economies enjoyed during the “golden age” of neoliberalism was the hubris behind such shock therapy economic and legal reform measures. The legitimacy behind these governance institutions were built on “engender[ed] rationalities” that defined “correct” or “normal” practices, much as one can see in financial markets and ratings agencies.

International economic law has largely been guilty of these same ontological fallacies. The legitimacy of government measures or policy is based on a set of practices or norms that seek to liberalize trade and investment. The instruments and mechanisms of international economic law, particularly dispute settlement, acts as legitimizing agents upholding those liberalizing practices and norms. Turning to the SDGs, it is evident that the legitimacy of trade governance is premised on differentiation (see, for instance, 3.b, 8.a, 10.a, and 14.6), which meant providing different treatment and compliance requirements based on the state of development. Turning to 17.10, however, clearly demonstrates that the normative substance behind the legitimacy is premised on set practices or norms:

17.10 Promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization, including through the conclusion of negotiations under its Doha Development Agenda

Looking specifically at the WTO, it is clear that it has yet to work out the normative challenges concerning legitimacy as a governance institution. The collapse of the Doha Round of trade negotiations in 2005 and again in 2006 embody the division within the institution and its Member States on the constituent practices and norms of the WTO. During the Doha Round, the developing economy Member States of the WTO raised objections to full implementation of WTO obligations, seeking to carve out conditions that better serve their development context. These demands have run up against the desire of developed economy Member States, which largely seek to phase out the differentiated treatment offered to developing economies on the basis of freeriding and exploiting such entitlements in unfair ways. For instance, one such demand by developing economies has been to include special and differential treatment in enforcing compliance at the level of dispute settlement. While this would seem like a logical step in assisting developing economies reach their SDG targets, the legal ramifications of exceptional treatment to certain members are complicated. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and Appellate Body do not have the authority to set new standards or norms in the process of resolving disputes, rather they depend on enforcing WTO law. Yet without sufficient consideration of the normative issues concerning legitimacy that this exposition attempted to point out, the DSB and Appellate Body only serve as legitimization agents that perpetuate the existing normative shortcomings of the WTO as an economic governance institution.

There is no single, authoritative way to test whether a public policy, and at a wider scope governance, can claim legitimacy. The factors constituting legitimacy are inevitably intertwined with the theoretical foundations of a discipline as well as its practice and metamorphosis over time. Economic governance and its institutions, especially dispute settlement mechanisms like the WTO DSB and investor-State dispute settlement, must strive to engage this dynamic legitimacy or otherwise face the doldrums of institutional irrelevance.


The views expressed in this publication are those of the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of any institution. 

November 13, 2019

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